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Introduction 
The Regional Maritime $erurity Initiative (RMSI), proposed in 2004 by Admiral Thomas B. Fargo. former commander of the US Pacific Command, is one of 
the American maritime security programs and initiatives designed to p romote re-
gional cooperation and improve maritime security in the East Asia and Pacific re-
gion, especially in the strai ts of Malacca and Singapore.] The main goal of RMSJ is 
to develop a partnership of willing nations. working together under international 
and domestic law, to identify, monitor and intercept transnational maritime 
threats. in particular piracy, armed robbery and terrorist attacks at sea.2 This initia-
tive is now coordinated jointly by the US Pacific Command and the US Depart-
ment of State. 3 
The Strait of Malacca, six hundred miles long and only one and a half m iles 
wide at its narrowest point, is a con fined stretch of water between Peninsular Ma-
laysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. From an economic and strategic 
perspective, it is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, the 
equivalent of the Suez Canal or Panama Canal. The Strait of Malacca forms the 
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seaway connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific 
Ocean, linking three of the world's most populous nations: India, Indonesia and 
China. Annually, approximately fifty thousand large vessels, and daily, an average 
of forty-five oil tankers, pass through the strait.4 Daily, about six hundred cargo 
vessels carrying everything from Japanese nuclear waste bound for reprocessing fa-
cilities in Europe to raw materials for China's booming economy traverse the Strait 
of Malacca.5 It is estimated that two-thirds of the world's liquefied natural gas 
(LNG);6 between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's sea trade; half of the 
global oil shipments carried by sea; and over 80 percent of the oil and gas imports 
of China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea come through the Strait ofMalacca. The 
number of ships passing through the strait is projected to increase due to the rapid 
economic growth of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It has been estimated 
that within the next twenty years two-thirds of China's petroleum imports will 
flow from the Middle East, most probably through the Strait of Malacca.7 While 
two alternative waterways are available for international shipping (the Sunda Strait 
and the Lombok and Makassar straits through Indonesian archipelagic waters), if 
the Strait of Malacca was closed a detour through these alternative routes would 
add a significant amount of shipping time and cost. 
In recent years the Strait of Malacca has increasingly become the target of piracy 
and armed robbery against vessels. This upsurge in the violence directed against 
shipping is not surprising given the high volume of transiting traffic, the geograph-
ical nature of the strait, the significant political and economic instability in the 
area, and the lack of resources and weak maritime law enforcement capacity of the 
littoral States. Since the September I I, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, 
increasing attention has been given to the threat of maritime terrorism, prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD ) and the security of the maritime 
transport sector in general. As a result of this changed strategic environment in the 
Strait of Malacca area, there has also been a growing conviction among the li ttoral 
States of the need to establish a burden-sharing arrangement, based on Article 43 
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Conven-
tion ).8 Such an arrangement would be designed to help cover the gmdually increas-
ing cost of providing essential maritime infrastructure in the Strait ofMalacca and, 
over the years, to keep the waters clear of pollution, safe for navigation, and free 
from the threat of pirate and terrorist attacks. 
User States, especially China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are depen-
dent on the strait for the smooth and efficient transit of cargo, in particular energy 
supplies, also raised concerns about the safety and security of their vessels and have 
demanded that enhanced security measures be taken by the States that border the 
Strait of Malacca.9 Other user States that are among the major maritime powers, 
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such as the United States, also raised maritime security concerns regarding the po-
tential threat of transnational crimes, maritime terrorism and armed attacks 
against their naval and commercial vessels traversing the strait. As a result, the mar-
itime powers began to explore possible means of becoming involved more directly in 
the management of security matters in the Strait of Malacca. These efforts, how-
ever, were regarded by the littoral States as an attempt to "internationalize" the 
safety and security of the Strait ofMalacca. In response, the li ttoral States reiterated 
their positions that enhancing safety and security and managing environmental is-
sues in the strait are primarily their responsibility. 
It is against this background that, when the idea of a RMSI was first introduced 
in Admiral Fargo's speech to the US Congress on March 31, 2004, Indonesia and 
Malaysia strongly rejected the idea of patrols by foreign powers in the Strait of 
Malacca. The governments of these two nations also raised the concern that a US 
naval presence in the strait would actually attract terrorist attacks and bolster the 
appeal of extremists. However, Singapore, with its economy heavily dependent on 
global commercial traffic through the strait, sees piracy, armed robbery and mari-
time terrorism as major security threats, and therefore supported the RMSI, argu-
ing that it is an intensive and complex task to safeguard the waterways against 
maritime terrorism and that no single State has the resources to deal effectively 
with the maritime security threat in the Strait of Malacca. 
In response to the serious concerns of Indonesia and Malaysia, the American se-
curity initiative was modified to delete the original proposal to deploy US fo rces to 
conduct patrols in the strait. On the other hand, due in large measure to the pros-
pect of foreign intervention in safeguarding the security of the Strait of Malacca, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to carry out coordinated sea and air patrols 
to curb piracy and armed robbery, and to increase maritime securi ty. The decision 
of the Joint War Committee OWC) of Lloyd's Market Association in June 2005 to 
declare the Strait of Malacca a "war-risk and terrorist zone" also prompted the 
three littoral States to take a series of unilateral, bilateral and trilateral cooperative 
actions to improve the security environment of the Strait of Malacca. 
Malaysia, for instance, announced that its armed police will be placed on board 
selected tug boats and barges traversing the Strait of Malacca. In additio n, an 
escort service will be provided for vessels carrying val uable goods in the strait. 
Malaysia also declared that it will begin twenty-four-hour surveillance of the 
strait.1O A new Malaysian Maritime Enfo rcement Agency (MMEA) was also estab-
lished and began patrolling the Strait ofMalacca in November 2005. Bilateral coor-
dinated patrols between Malaysia and Indonesia, and between Indonesia and 
Singapore, have also been worked out to bring together their respective agencies 
involved in anti-piracy and anti-robbery activities. In July 2004, Indonesia, 
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Malaysia and Singapore launched a new trilateral coordinated patrols initiative 
(Malsindo ) in the Strait of Malacca, which was seen as another major response of 
the littoral States to the increasingly challenging issue of safety and security of the 
strait. In addition, in August 2005, the three littoral States agreed to implement 
joint air patrols over the Strait ofMalacca in a bid to boost security in the waterway, 
which has been dubbed the "Eyes in the Sky" plan. In April 2006, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia and Singapore signed an agreement to form a Joint Coordinating Committee 
on the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP ) and Standard Operational Procedures on Co-
ordinated Patrols. II 
The purpose of this article is to examine the development of the US-proposed 
RMSI and its influence on national and regional efforts being undertaken to en-
hance security in the Malacca strait and will focus, in particular, on the littoral 
States' responses to the American security initiative. The paper first looks into the 
background of the introduction of the idea ofRMSI by the US Pacific Command in 
March 2004; second, it provides an overview of the RMSI and the implementation 
of the initiative; third, it examines the preliminary national responses of the three 
States that border the Strait of Malacca to the US initiative; fourth, it summarizes 
the views of selected ocean law and maritime security experts on the legality, justifi-
cation and political implications of the initiative; fifth, it addresses the steps taken 
by the littoral States unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, between July 2004 
and June 2006, to enhance security in the Strait ofMalacca; sixth, it summarizes the 
important regional responses and efforts to help enhance security in the Malacca 
strait; seventh, it discusses the role played by existing mechanisms in the region in 
processes to help develop cooperative efforts to improve security in the strait; and 
finally, it offers the author's observations regarding policy outcomes in terms of lit-
toral States' responses to the US-proposed RMSI and the challenges lying ahead fo r 
advancing maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. 
Background for the Regional Maritime Security Initiative Concept 
The September I I, 2001 attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks in the United 
States profoundly changed the Bush administratio n's strategic thinking on na-
tional security. This change was reflected in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, which were released by the White House in September 2002 
and December 2002, respectively.ll This new strategic thinking is defined by (1) 
the way in which the United States uses force in the post-9f I I world, (2) how the 
United States defmes defense and (3) the way the United States approaches prolif-
eration. U Under the new strategy, winning the war against terrorism and stopping 
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the proliferation of WMD have become priority missions of the American armed 
forces. In the maritime domain,I4 preventing terrorist attacks and criminal or hos-
tile acts has also emerged as one of the key US policy objectives that guide the na-
tion's maritime security activities. 
In October 2000, terrorists in a boat laden with explosives carried out a suicide 
bombing of the USS Cole (DDG 67) in the harbor at Aden, Yemen. Seventeen US 
sailors were killed and over thirty others were wounded. The attack, organized by 
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist organization, was carried out by suicide 
bombers Ibrahim al-Thawr and Abdullah al_Misawa. l5 After the September 11 th 
attacks, the United States became more concerned about potential terrorist attacks 
in the Strait ofMalacca area, as demonstrated in late 200 1 and early 2002 when US 
and Indian naval forces collaborated to protect American merchant shipping at the 
northern end of the strait. l6 The US perception of the maritime security threat in 
Southeast Asia and the Malacca strait was further reinforced in late 2002 and 2003 
by three elements: (1) increasing concerns over the association of piracy with ter-
rorist organizations in the region; (2) US and foreign security intelligence reports 
indicating that US-flag vessels, both civilian and military, could be attacked byter-
rorist groups when sailing through the strait or anchoring at ports; and (3) the in-
creasing number of reports of pirate and maritime terrorist attack incidents that 
occurred in Southeast Asia and in the Strait of Malacca. 
According to the available evidence obtained by the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and other Western intelligence services, terrorist groups have al-
ready considered striking at maritime targets, particularly in the Strait of Malacca. 
The video tapes seized from the Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyya OI), 
which included footage of Malaysian maritime police patrols, indicate that this ter-
rorist group was observing security procedures operating in the strait. Members ofJI 
have been trained in seaborne guerrilla tactics, such as suicide diving capabilities and 
ramming. A basic diving manual recovered in Kandahar in Afghanistan was seen as 
further evidence of a larger plan to launch maritime attacks by the al-Qaeda net-
works and it is well known thatJ ! has links with al-Qaeda. 17 It is believed that other 
terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, such as the Free Aceh Movement (also known as 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)), the Abu SayyafGroup, the Moro Islamic Libera-
tion Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), are also en-
gaging in maritime piracy or terrorist attacks in the region. Following the arrests of 
several JI operatives in Singapore in December 2001, it was revealed that the terrorist 
group was plotting to blow up US warships docked at the Changi Naval Base in Singa-
pore.IS Warnings about terrorist groups' plans to seize US-flag vessels in the Strait of 
Malacca had also been issued by US intelligence serviceS. l9 
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A number of reports on pirate and maritime terrorist attacks in late 2002 and 
2003 also increased US concerns about possible attacks against its vessels transiting 
the watenvays in the Strait of Malacca and Southeast Asia. In October 2002, the 
MV Limburg, a French oil tanker, was attacked by an explosive-laden boat.20 The 
organizer of the attack was Abd al Rahman al Nashir, who was also believed to have 
been responsible for the attack on the Cole. The Limburg attack not only high-
lighted the vulnerability of cargo ships to terrorist attacks but also confirmed US 
concerns that it is not beyond the capabilities of terrorist groups to cany out assaults 
on maritime interests such as vessels and ports. In March 2003, the Indonesian 
chemical tanker Dewi Madrim was boarded by ten pirates from a speedboat in the 
congested southern reaches of the Strait of Malacca . The pirates were equipped 
with machine guns and machetes and carried VHF radios. Having disabled the 
tanker's communications and tied up the crew, the pirates took the helm and navi-
gated the vessel for about an hour before departing with the master and first officer 
as hostages. According to a study by Aegis Defence SelVices, a London-based de-
fense and security consultancy, the temporary hijacking of the Dewi Madrim was 
an attempt by terrorists to learn how to pilot a ship, and the kidnapping was aimed 
at acquiring expertise to help the terrorists mount a maritime attack. The Dewi 
Madrim attack was therefore considered the equivalent of the tactics of the al-
Qaeda hijackers who perpetrated the September 11 th attacks after going to a flight 
school in Florida.21 Singapore's defense minister, Tony Tan, also stated that the 
Dewi Madrim incident and others like it were practice runs for a terrorist attack.22 
In February 2004, six al-Qaeda-linked Muslim militants of the Abu SayyafGroup 
bombed SuperFerry 14, leaving over one hundred people dead. Philippine presi-
dent Gloria Arroyo confirmed that the attack was the work ofterrorists.2J In addi-
tion to the maritime terrorist attacks, pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca also 
increased from sixteen to twenty-eight in 2003 and from twenty-eight to thirty-
seven in 2004.2-4 According to the International Maritime Bureau's piracy report-
ing center, seventy of the 251 global reports of piratical attacks in the first nine 
months of 2004 occurred in the Strait of Malacca.25 
The US Pacific Command is the headquarters responsible for all American air, 
ground and maritime military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Strait of 
Malacca and Southeast Asia are within the area of responsibility of this command, 
the mission of which is to promote security and peaceful development in the re-
gion by deterring aggression, advancing regional security cooperation, responding 
to crises, and fighting to win.26 Since the September 11 attacks, prosecuting and 
winning the global war on terrorism has become one of the command's major fo-
cus areas. In response to the increasing maritime security threat in the Strait of 
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Malacca and Southeast Asia, as demonstrated above, the US Pacific Command de-
veloped the concept ofRMSI. 
The Development and Overview of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
On March 31, 2004, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee re-
garding US Pacific Command posture, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, its commander, 
stated that despite notable successes in the war on terrorism, the United States re-
mained deeply concerned about transnational threats from terrorist organizations 
such as al-Qaeda, Jl and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
United States sensed increasing synergy between transnational threats like terror-
ism, illicit d rugs, trafficking in humans, piracy and especially WMD proliferation. 
To improve in ternational cooperat ion against these transnational security threats, 
President George Bush launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the 
State Department proposed the Malacca Strai ts Initiative in 2003. To help 
operationalize these initiatives, the US Pacific Command introduced the concept 
of RMSJ.21 During the question and answer session at the same hearings, in re-
sponse to the questions raised by Congressman Rick Larsen about RMSI and its re-
lationship to the PSI, Admiral Fargo cited the lack of information and intelligence 
on the transnational maritime threat. The Admiral noted that there was wide-
spread support fo r RMSI and stated: 
I just came back from Singapore and had a very solid conversation with the "Sings" and 
they're going to help us with this. My instinct, it probably ought to start at the Strait of 
[MalaccaJ and work its way out, because the Straits of [MalaccaJ are funda mental to 
the movement of all of the energy through the region . . . . We need to know who's 
moving through the sea space. We need to know the status of ships. We need 
participation from the vast majori ty of them so that we can single out and cue on those 
that aren't within the law.28 
It was Admiral Fargo's belief that RMSI would receive a very broad range of sup-
port from the countries in the region, induding the three littoral States of the 
Malacca strait.29 
As far as the means to implement the initiative are concerned-in particular, to 
carry out maritime interdiction operations in the Strait of Malacca-the Admiral 
indicated that 
We're looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting Special Operations Forces on 
high-speed vessels, putting, potentially, Marines on high-speed vessels so that we can 
use boats that might be incorporated with these vessels to conduct effective 
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interdiction in . .. these sea lines of communications where terrorists are known to 
move about and transit throughout the region. Xl 
This proposal later became the main reason two of the littoral States of the Malacca 
strait- Indonesia and Malaysia-rejected the idea of RMSl. In response to the 
strong reactions from the littoral States, US ambassador to Indonesia Ralph L. 
Boyce clarified the statement in Jakarta in Apri12004, saying, "Admiral Fargo never 
said the US was going to send its marines or special forces to the Straits ofMalacca. 
The APP story . .. was misleading. "3] The US embassy in Malaysia also made the 
same clarification, adding that the RMSI would be conducted within existing inter-
national laws.32 Having clarified Admiral Fargo's proposal, the US State Depart-
ment continued to call on the nations in the Asia-Pacific region to work more 
closely to deal with the transnational threats, in particular, terrorism, piracy and 
other crimes, including drug trafficking and human trafficking. US deputy assis-
tant secretary of state for East Asia Matthew Daley, for instance, warned at the Dia-
logue on Security in Asia, held in Singapore in Apri12004, that "Asia's waters are 
prime targets for A1-Qaeda and other terrorists" and "[ w]hether we are talking 
about acts of piracy or terrorist attacks or even transnational problems, such as 
trafficking of persons or drugs, the terrorist aspect is not to be underestimated. "33 
Daley also stressed that the concern over the potential maritime terrorist attacks 
was not simply theoretical but was going to be an essential area of multilateral co-
operation in the Asia-Pacific region in the months and years to come.:M 
In May 2004, Admiral Fargo further elaborated his idea ofRMSI at the Military 
Operations and Law Conference held in Victoria, British Columbia, where he also 
emphasized the importance of conducting the initiative under existing interna-
tional laws, including the laws of war and respect for national sovereignty. As he 
explained at the conference: 
The goal of RMSJ is to develop a partnership of willing regional nations with varying 
capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime 
threats under existing international and domestic laws. This collective effort will 
empower each participating nation with the timely information and capabilities it 
needs to act against maritime threats in its own territorial seas. A$ always, each nation 
will have to decide for itself what response, if any, it will take in its own waters. 
Information sharing will also contribute to the security of international seas, creating 
an environment hostile to terrorism and other criminal activities. Any RMSI activity in 
international waters will, again, be in accordance with existing international law. 3S 
There were five elements in the RMSI proposed by Admiral Fargo. These are 
(1) increased situational awareness and information sharing, (2) responsive 
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decision-making architectures, (3) maritime interdiction capabilities, (4) li ttoral 
security and (5) interagency cooperation. He also made it dear that RMSI is not a 
treaty or an alliance and that the initiative will not result in a standing naval force 
patrolling the Pacific. Admiral Fargo added that the initiative differs from the PSI in 
the sense that it is not a global effort, but will focus on maritime transnational 
threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, RMSI is not a challenge to sovereignty, 
and activities undertaken under the initiative will not violate existing international 
and domestic laws.36 
In July 2004, the United States and the Philippines co-hosted the Maritime 
Threats Workshop held in Cebu in the Philippines. A major topic of the workshop 
was the US-proposed RMSI, which "emphasizes information sharing, providing 
cueing of emerging threats, contributing to the security of international seas, and 
most important, creating an environment hostile to terrorism and other criminal 
activities."37 It was stated that RMSI could empower each nation to take action it 
deems necessary to protect itselfin its own waters, thereby enhancing the region's 
collective security. While the participants agreed that RMSI could provide a plan of 
action to address the transnational maritime threats in the region, they also recom-
mended the use of existing fora and internationaUregional programs that are ap-
propriate to address RMSI objectives in order to avoid establishing additional 
mechanisms. The existing mechanisms include the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN ), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation group (APEC).38 
In November 2004, an ovelView of RMSI was provided on the website of the US 
Pacific Command, along with links to the US Pacific Command Strategy for Re-
gional Maritime Security and other RMSI-related documents. These docwnents 
provide a more accurate understanding of RMSI, its strategic intent and status)9 
The Strategy for Regional Maritime Security stated clearly in its executive sum-
mary that RMSI "is designed to deny the use of the maritime domain by those who 
pose a threat to the Asia-Pacific region's maritime security, including transnational 
terrorists and criminals. "40 The nations participating in this initiative will utilize a 
cross-discipline, interagency approach to facilitate the development of regional 
maritime security capacities and conduct activities to establish and maintain a se-
cure maritime environment. Implementation ofRMSI will be accomplished by co-
ordinating activities between the United States and the participating nations in the 
region that support the following common elements of maritime security: ( I) in-
creased situational awareness and information sharing; (2) responsive decision-
making architectures; (3) enhanced maritime interception capacity; and (4) 
agency, ministerial and international coopcration.41 
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According to the regional maritime security strategy, RMSI activities will be un-
dertaken in the territorial waters of the participating nations and international wa-
ters of the Pacific and Indian oceans to counter "maritime threats" that include 
terrorism, maritime piracy, illegal trafficking (Le., narcotics, weapons, human and 
illicit cargo) and other criminal activities in the maritime domain.~ 2 RMSI will be 
implemented through a cooperative effort, emphasizing interactions with the gov-
ernments, international organizations and private sectors in the region, and will be 
based upon existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The international or-
ganizations dealing with maritime security issues in the region include, but are not 
limited to, ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN Security Community (ASC), APEC, Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), International Maritime Bureau 
(1MB), North Pacific Heads of Coast Guard Agencies, United Nations International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
(WPNS)." 
The strategic intent of RMSI is to carry out the four common dements of mari-
time security mentioned earlier through cooperative efforts. Accordingly, the 
RMSI-participating nations will establish procedures, processes and standards to 
fuse information and the means to share the information; support the develop-
ment of responsive decision-making architectures and regional maritime security 
capacity through agency, ministerial and international unity of effort; engage in 
appropriate fora to gain the requisite understanding of existing maritime securi ty 
capacities; and develop cooperative arrangements to monitor, identify and inter-
cept suspect vessels and transnational threats in territorial and international waters, 
consistent with international and domestic law. RMSI will also leverage appropri-
ate elements of national and international resources and capabilities and will com-
plement ongoing cooperative security activities such as bilateral and multilateral 
exercises, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Counterdrug (CD) Operations, 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), International Port Secu-
rity Program (IPSP), International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Multinational Planning Augmentation 
Team (M PAT), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Regional Cooperation Agree-
ment on Anti-Piracy (ReCAAP), and Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR).oW 
Table I (below) illustrates security in the Asia-Pacific maritime continuum. 
In December 2004, President Bush promulgated National Security Presidential 
Directive 41 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD-4I1HSPD- 13), 
which established US policy, guidelines and implementation actions to enhance 
US national interests and homeland security by protecting US maritime interests. 
The directives also established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Commit-
tee to coordinate interagency maritime security policy efforts. In recognition of the 
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importance of the maritime domain to US national security interests, and given the 
potential threat to US maritime security, the US government decided to 
[D Jeploy the full range of its operational assets and capabilities to prevent the Maritime 
Domain from being used by terrorists, criminals, and hostile States to commit acts of 
terrorism and criminal or other unlawful or hostile acts against the United States, its 
people, economy, property, territory, allies, and friends, while recognizing that 
maritime security policies are most effective when the strategic importance of 
international trade, economic cooperation, and the free flow of commerce are 
considered appropriate1y.<fs 
It thus became US policy "to take all necessary and appropriate actions. consistent 
with U.S. law. treaties and other international agreements to which the United States 
is a party. and customary international law as determined for the United States by the 
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Table 1: Security in the Asia-Pacific Maritime Continuum 
Source: US Pacific Command. RMSI: The Idea, The Facts<t7 
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Accordingly, President Bush directed the secretaries of defense and homeland 
security to jointly lead a collaborative interagency effort to draft a recommended 
National Strategy for Maritime Security.48 In concert with the development of the 
national strategy, the following actions were tasked: (1) Maritime Domain Awareness, 
(2) Global Maritime Intelligence Integration, (3) Domestic Outreach, (4) Coordi-
nation of International Efforts and International Outreach, (5) Maritime Threat 
Response, (6) Maritime Infrastructure Recovery, (7) Maritime Transportation 
System Security, and (8) Maritime Commerce Security.49 While the term "Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative" was not found in the directive, it is dear that Admiral 
Fargo's concept ofRMSI had been incorporated into NSPD-41/HSPD-13. 
In February 2005, Admiral William J. Fallon was nominated by President Bush 
and confirmed by the US Senate to succeed Admiral Fargo as the new Commander, 
US Pacific Command. Thereafter, RMSI continued to constitute an integral part of 
the command's maritime security strategy. As reflected in Admiral Fallon's re-
marks at the 4th Annual Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in June 2005, the 
concept ofRMSI remains very much alive. He noted that RMSI was launched by 
his predecessor and reiterated US Pacific Command's concern over the maritime 
security threat in the Asia-Pacific region. He pointed out that because knowledge 
of activities in the sea space is incomplete, unseen threats can develop and therefore 
it is essential to develop dose cooperation among nations and between maritime 
organizations, both State and non-governmental, in the region. In addition, with 
due respect for national sovereignty, Admiral Fallon suggested that organizational 
and operational issues should be priority items for agreement for the purpose of 
enhancing maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.5(I 
In September 2005, the National Strategy for Maritime Security51 was issued by 
the White House, listing the following threats to US maritime security: (1) nation-
State threats associated with terrorism and WMD attacks; (2) terrorist threats, in 
particular those associated with attacks by possible use of WMD and attacks at or 
from the sea; (3) transnational criminal and piracy threats; (4) environmental de-
struction; and (5) illegal seaborne immigration. The US perception of maritime 
terrorist threats is reflected in the following security assessment: 
Terrorists can also develop effective attack capabilities relatively quickly using a variety 
of platforms, including explosives-laden suicide boats ... and light aircraft; merchant 
and cruise ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or 
offshore platfonn; commercial vessels as launch platfonns for missile attacks; 
underwater swimmers to inftltrate ports; and unmanned underwater explosive 
delivery vehicles. Mines are also an effective weapon because they are low-cost, readily 
available, easily deployed, difficult to counter and require minimal training. Terrorists 
can also take advantage of a vessel's legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or 
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liquefied natural gas. as the explosive component of an attack. Vessels can be used to 
transport powerful conventional explosives or WMD for detonation in a port or 
alongside an offshore facility. 52 
To achieve the objectives of the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the fol-
lowing five strategic actions are to be taken collectively by the United States, other 
willing nations and international organizations: (1) enhance international cooper-
ation, (2) maximize domain awareness, (3 ) embed security into commercial prac-
tices, (4) deploy layered security and (5) assure continuity of the marine 
transportation system. 53 Specifically referring to the management of security in the 
Strait ofMalacca, it is the policy of the United States to "use the agencies and com-
ponents of the Federal Government in innovative ways to improve the security of 
sea-lanes that pass through international straitS."S4 The United States intends to 
work with its regional and international partners to expand maritime security ef-
forts. Since regional maritime security regimes are a major international compo-
nent of the US national strategy, and are essential for ensuring the effective security 
of regional seas, the United States is willing to work closely with other governments 
and international and regional organizations to enhance the maritime security ca-
pabilities of other key nations by adopting the following measures: 
• Offering maritime and port security assistance, training and consultation; 
• Coordinating and prioritizing maritime security assistance and liaison 
within regions; 
• Allocating economic assistance to developing nations fo r maritime security 
to enhance security and prosperity; 
• Promoting implementation of the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its amendment and 
other international agreements; and 
• Expanding the International Port Security and Maritime Liaison Officer 
programs, and the number of agency attaches. 55 
In addition to the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the relevant US de-
partments and agencies have developed eight supporting plans to address the spe-
cific threats and challenges of the maritime environment, which include: 
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness;56 
The Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan;s7 
The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan;58 
• The International Outreach and Coordination Strategy;S9 
The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan;60 
109 
Security in the Strait of Malacca and Regional Responses to the US Proposal 
The Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations;61 
• The Maritime Commerce Security Plan;62 and 
The Domestic Outreach Plan.!)) 
In November 2005, the Department of State submitted the International Out-
reach and Coordination Strategy fo r the National Strategy for Maritime Securi ty64 
to the White House. The strategy aims to advance the policies set by President Bush 
in the National Security Strategy,6S the National Strategy for Homeland Securi ty66 
and the National Strategy for Maritime Security and to help accomplish the presi-
dent's vision of a fully coordinated US government effort to protect the nation's in-
terests in the maritime domain. In order to achieve the strategic goals of the 
International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, the US Department of State 
works together with the US Pacific Command to implement RMSI. In February 
2006, it was reported that the State Department has proposed a $4.8 billion military 
aid budget for Fiscal Year 2007, in which $2 million is allocated to RMSL67 On 
March 7, 2006, Admiral Fallon, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, stated that " [wJinning the war on terrorism is U.S. Pacific Com-
mand's highest priority" and that Southeast Asia remains the command's focal 
point in the war on terror.68 
On February 15-17, 2006, the United States held a conference in Alameda, Cali-
fornia to discuss ways and means to help coordinate potential donor contributions 
in maritime security efforts in the Malacca strait. Sponsored by the US Department 
of State and the US Coast Guard, this meeting was attended by the US Pacific Com-
mand, like-minded countries using the strai t, the International Maritime Bureau 
(1MB), private sector representatives and other observers. The three littoral States 
of the Malacca strait-Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore-were not invited to the 
conference. China was invited to the conference but did not attend. Taiwan was 
not invited because of sensitive political reasons. 
The Alameda conference was an important initiative and was held under the lMO 
framework. However, in comparison with the news coverage on the US-proposed 
RMSI back in May 2004, surprisingly no reports on the Alameda conference were re-
ported in the media, except an item in the Defense News regarding India's announce-
ment during the conference that its maritime surveillance force would jointly patrol 
the Strait ofMalacca with the United States,69 a very brief report on the conference at 
the US Department of State's Fact Sheet on Maritime Security in the East Asian and 
Pacific Region,70 and the commentary on the Institute of Defence and Strategic 
Studies website entitled "Burden Sharing in the Straits: Not So Straightforward" by 
Sam Bateman.11 The latter commented that the Alameda conference appeared to 
pre-empt the initial task of the littoral States in identifying and prioritizing their 
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needs to enhance safety and security and manage environmental matters, and allo-
cated a leading role to the user States of the Strait ofMalacca. In addition, this meet-
ing appeared to attach little significance to Article 43 of the 1982 LOS Conventionn 
that has been the key focus of the littoral States over the past five years and the cor-
nerstone of the IMO initiative that was discussed and agreed to at the Meeting on the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental 
Protection held in Jakarta, Indonesia in September 2005. 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the littoral States' initial responses to the 
US-proposed RMSl, it is important to mention briefly a fact sheet provided by the 
US Department of State,73 mainly because the document describes the US mari-
time security policy, especially in the Malacca strait area. According to this fact 
sheet, it is the US policy to seek to develop cooperative mechanisms to enhance the 
safety, security and environmental protection of strategic waterways in the East 
Asia and Pacific region, in particular the Strait of Malacca. The United States will 
work with like-minded countries and those littoral States responsible for safe-
guarding the important strategic waterways in the region. The fact sheet further 
provides that it is the common goal of the United States, like-minded nations and 
the littoral States bordering the strategic waterways "bilaterally and multilaterally, 
to develop a partnership of willing nations to enhance the overall capabilities and 
capacities to identify, monitor, and respond to maritime threats consistent with le-
gal authorities and frameworks ."'~ 
Especially in the Strait ofMalacca, the United States will work with global part-
ners to ensure (1) recipient and user-State donor coordination based on the bur-
den sharing of resources, (2) the interoperability of the partners' activities, (3) the 
sustainability of the joint strategies and (4) the prevention of redundancy among 
other maritime security efforts. Each of these four aims, as set forth in the fact 
sheet, must match both the priorities and needs of recipient States. The United 
States will work with responsible States, user States, multilateral organizations and 
private sector partners7S on planning, capacity building, information sharing, In-
ternational Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code implementation, techni-
cal assistance, training and exercises, private sector outreach, maritime 
environmental stewardship and counterterrorism. 
Littoral States' Perceptions of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
It is dear that right before the US Pacific Command's announcement of the RMSI 
concept, Admiral Fargo had secured support for the initiative from the government 
of Singapore, as demonstrated in the question and answer portion of his testimony 
before the House Anned Services Committee on March 31, 2004. Admiral Fargo 
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stated that "I just came back from Singapore and had a very solid conversation with 
the [Singaporeans] and they're going to help us with [RMSI]."76 The Admiral ex-
pected a very broad range of support for RMSI, mainly because "[a] ll of the coun-
tries in the region are concerned about the transnational threat,"n which includes 
terrorism, proliferation and the trafficking in humans. The initial reactions from 
the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia to the RMSI proposal in May and June 
2004 proved that Admiral Fargo's assessment of regional support for the initiative 
was incorrect, especially in regard to the notion of putting US Special Operations 
Forces or marines on high-speed vessels to conduct maritime interdiction in the 
Strait ofMalacca. The three littoral States' perceptions of, and initial reactions to, 
RMSI are examined below. 
Indonesia 
Shortly after the media's disclosure of the US plan to deploy troops in the Strait of 
Malacca, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on the official 
position of the country in its opposition to the plan, arguing that Indonesia and 
Malaysia, in accordance with the 1982 LOS Convention, were solely responsible for 
guarding the Strait of Malacca.18 Nugroho Wisnumurti, former director general 
for political affairs of Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that 
Fighting terrorism through regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, or any part of the 
globe forthat matter, is something to be applauded. However, fighting terrorism in the 
Malacca and Singapore Straits by allowing the use of military force by any country 
other than the coastal states (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) is another matter.79 
Indonesian Navy Chief Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh joined the opposition, 
calling the idea of sending special operations troops to the Strait of Malacca under 
RMSI "baseless."8(1 During the Second Indonesia-United States Security Dialogue, 
held in Washington, DC, April 22-23, 2004, the Indonesian delegation sought clar-
ification regarding the US policy towards the Strait of Malacca. In response, the US 
delegation clarified the concept ofRMSI and gave assurances that the United States 
would respect Indonesia's sovereignty over its waters. The US delegation further 
agreed to continue to consult with Indonesia and other regional nations.Bl 
In June 2004, when attending the 3rd Asian Security Conference (known as the 
"Shangri-La Dialogue") in Singapore, US defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 
told a group of Asian reporters that RMSI was an idea in its early stage and wouJd 
not threaten sovereignty. The Secretary clarified that "raI ny implications that it 
would impinge in any way on the sovereign territorial waters of some countries 
wouJd be inaccurate."82 Admiral Walter F. Doran, the United States Pacific Fleet 
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commander, who accompanied Secretary Rumsfeld at the conference, also told re-
porters that Admiral Fargo's testimony did not imply that establishing new US 
bases and units or stationing elite forces in the region are part of RMSL Admiral 
Doran pointed out that the main idea of the initiative was to build on normal navy-
to-navy contacts and discussions to raise maritime situational awareness in the 
Asia-Pacific region.83 
Despite the clarification made by high-ranking officials of the US government, 
including Admiral Fargo and Defense Secretary Rwnsfeld, Indonesia's concerns 
over the possible intervention by foreign maritime powers, in particular the United 
States, in the management of the Strait of Malacca remained. As reported, Indonesia 
was displeased with joint naval patrols conducted by the navies of India and the 
United States for several months in 2003.&4 The reasoning behind this displeasure 
was Indonesia's worries about US involvement in a broader strategy that favored a 
permanent Indian presence in Southeast Asia, with the endorsement of Singapore.85 
According to another analysis, while the US government repeatedly stated that 
RMSI was still in its early stage and was mainly concerned with sharing informa-
tion, rather than with deploying US troops in the Strait ofMalacca, Indonesia con-
tinued to raise its objection to the US proposal, largely because of its long-standing 
policy of seeking regional solutions to regional security problems, and its govern-
ment's need to appease a large, anti-American nationalist and Islamist domestic 
political audience. In addition, Indonesia perceived that the US proposal repre-
sented a challenge to regional self-management of security issues.86 
Malaysia 
The government of Malaysia, taking the same position as that of Indonesia, ob-
jected strongly to the US idea of sending troops to help patrol in the Strait of 
Malacca under the proposed RMSL Yab Dato Seri and Najib Tun Ra:zak, Malay-
sia's deputy prime minister and defence minister respectively, stated in early April 
2004 that "[iJn principle, ensuring the security of the Straits of Malacca is the re-
sponsibility of Malaysia and Indonesia and for the present we do not propose to in-
vite the United States to join the security operations we have mounted there."81 
The defence minister continued, "[e ]ven if they [the Americans ] wished to act, 
they should get our permission, as this touches on the question of our national 
sovereignty."88 Najib Raw denied that Malaysia and Indonesia needed help from 
non-littoral States to police the Malacca strait which, despite periodic raids by pi-
rates on smaller cargo vessels, was generally safe for shipping. Moreover, he 
pointed out that while Malaysia maintained good relations with the United States, 
indudingjoint military training, and that US vessels, including warships, were free 
to use the strait, to launch military operations in those waters the United States 
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should first obtain permission from the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia.89 
Mohamed Nazri Abdul Aziz, a minister in Malaysia's Prime Minister's Depart-
ment, warned that if the littoral States do not properly safeguard security in the 
Strait ofMalacca, foreign powers may be prone to intervene in managing the secu-
rity matters in the strait, which would pose a threat to Malaysia's sovereignty.90 
In June 2004, while continuing to reject the notion of the sending of US troops 
to the Strait of Malacca, Malaysia agreed to discuss the issue of protecting the strait 
from piracy and potential terrorist attacks with the United States.91 In the same 
month at the 3rd Shangri-La Dialogue, Malaysia again stressed its opposition to a 
US military presence in defending the Strait of Malacca and Southeast Asia from 
terrorist attacks but also agreed to the principles of sharing intelligence and block-
ing terrorists ' financial and logistical networks. Najib Tun Razak reminded the 
participating defense ministers of Malaysia's concerns over the negative impact of 
a foreign military presence on security and political stability in the region, because 
it would "set us back in our ideological battle against extremism and militancy. "92 
The government of Malaysia was aware of Singapore's strong support for the 
US- proposed RMSI and accused Singapore of calling on foreign powers to inter-
vene in security matters in the Strait of Malacca. Malaysia also disagreed with Singa-
pore's security assessment with regard to the link between pirate attacks and mari-
time terrorism. Malaysia did not believe that the problem of piracy in the Strait of 
Malacca was critical; what occurred were only minor robberies, as pointed out by 
Rahim Husin, Malaysia's director of the Maritime Security Policy Directorate. In ad-
dition, Malaysia claimed that its law enforcement agencies were more than capable 
to ensure securi ty in the strait without intervention from anyone.93 
Singapore 
Since the September 11 attacks, Singapore has been working closely with the 
United States to deal with the potential threats posed by terrorism and WMD pro-
liferation. Similar to the actions taken by Japan, Singapore participates actively in 
US-led security initiatives, such as the CSI and PSI. In August 2005, Singapore 
hosted the multinational PSI interdiction training exercise, Deep Sabre, in the 
South China Sea. Singapore also signed a new framework agreement with the 
United States for a strategic cooperation partnership in defense and security. The 
agreement expands the scope of bilateral cooperation between the two nations in 
such areas as anti-terrorism, anti-proliferation of WMD, joint military exercises 
and training, policy dialogues, and defense technology.94 Based on the close secu-
ri ty relations between Singapore and the United States, it comes as no surprise to 
see Singapore expressing its strong support for the US-proposed RMSI. As stated 
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earlier, shortly before the announcement of RMSI, Admiral Fargo had talks with 
the government of Singapore and obtained its support for the initiative.95 
In the area of managing security in the Strait ofMalacca, Singapore complained 
frequen tly about the lack of political will to take effective actions and weak law en-
forcement capacities of the other States that border the Malacca strait to counter 
the threat posed by transnational crimes, such as piracy and armed robberies at sea. 
To enhance the safety and security in the strait, Singapore has been calling upon re-
gional States and interested extra-regional powers to put pressure on the littoral 
States, in particular Indonesia. Singapore's perception of the maritime security 
threat has been greatly reinforced by the attacks on Cole in 2000, Limburg in 2002 
and Dewi Madrim in 2003. It has become Singapore's major worry that pirate at-
tacks might be linked to terrorist organizations that may launch terrorist attacks in 
the Malacca strait area. 
Singapore's reactions to the US-proposed RMSI were first reflected in the state-
ment made by its defence minister Teo Chee Hean in April 2004 that "the task of 
safeguarding the regional waters against maritime terrorism was complex and no 
single State had the resources to deal effectively with this threat."96 In response to 
this statement, Malaysia's foreign minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid pointed out 
that if Singapore had concerns about security in the Strait ofMalacca, it should fu st 
discuss them with the littoral States of Malaysia and Indonesia.91In May 2004, dep-
uty prime minister and coordinating minister for security and defence Tony Tan 
Keng Yam further elaborated Singapore's concerns over the threat of maritime ter-
rorism in Southeast Asia and the lack of security in the Strait ofMalacca. Tony Tan 
stated that "[tlhe possible nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism is proba-
bly the greatest concern to maritimesecurity."'l6 To counter the threat posed bypi-
racy and maritime terrorism, Singapore advocates a comprehensive approach that 
covers three overlapping domains, namely domestic, regional and international. 
Domestically, each country can tighten its port security by putting in place addi-
tional or enhanced measures. Regionally, the responsibility of the littoral States for 
the maritime security in the region must be recognized. At the same time, the litto-
ral States should take unified and concerted action to enhance the security of stra-
tegic waterways. Internationally, key players, such as the United Nations, IMO and 
other nations that have a stake in the safety and security of international water-
ways, must be involved to protect important sea lines of communications (SLOe) 
against pirate attacks and maritime terrorism.99 
At the 3rd Shangri-La Dialogue held in June 2004, Tony Tan reiterated Singa-
pore's concern over potential maritime attacks, pointing out that a ship sunk in the 
right spot in the Strait of Malacca would cripple world trade. He also raised the 
possibility of hijacked ships being turned into "floating bombs" and crashed into 
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critical infrastructure such as oil refineries or portsYXl It was later reported that 
Singapore proposed the idea that US Marines help patrol the Strait of Malacca, 
which further reinforced the belief of Malaysia and Indonesia that Singapore was 
using the terrorist threat as a tool to justify the US presence in the region .101 
Selected Ocean Law and Maritime Security Experts' Views on RMSJ 
In addition to the initial reactions of the three littoral States to the US- proposed 
RMSI, there can also be found comments made by ocean law and maritime experts 
in the region on the legitimacy, implications and possible impact of the initiative, 
some of which are summarized below. 
Malaysian Ocean Law and Maritime Security Experts 
Mohd Zaki Mohd Salleh 102 viewed the US concept of sending its troops to the Strait 
of Malacca under RMSI as a political ploy by Singapore. If the United States were 
allowed to patrol the strait on grounds of security, he argued, it would indirectly 
mean that Malaysia and Indonesia had recognized the presence of a superpower in 
the region. Mohd Zaki expressed the opinion that Singapore was concerned about 
Malaysia's efforts to modernize its armed forces, which posed a threat to Singa-
pore's sense of superiority in the region. To maintain that feeling of superiority, 
Singapore needed the US military presence in the Strait of Malacca and Southeast 
Asia. In addition, he did not believe that the problem of piracy in the region had 
reached a critical stage. The main reason for the sharp increase of pirate attacks in 
the Strait of Malacca area was, he argued, the economic slowdown in 1997_98.103 
B.A. HamzahlO4 maintained that the idea of inviting the US Navy to patrol the 
Strai t of Malacca had no legal basis. Hamzah argued that since the adoption of the 
1982 LOS Convention, which introduced transit passage rights in straits used for 
international navigation, the littoral States' control over the Strait of Malacca has 
been effectively eroded, given the fact that Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore had 
ratified, and were bound by the convention. However, while foreign ships and air-
craft enjoy the right of transit passage through the straits, they must refrain from 
any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of the States that border the strait. In particular, foreign ships and 
aircraft are prohibited from taking any military or non-military posture that can be 
construed by the littoral States as undermining their security. Hamzah elaborated 
that such posture includes naval patrols and training flights by foreign forces which 
are considered inconsistent with transit passage rights. Accordingly, both Malaysia 
and Indonesia were right in opposing the US proposal to send troops to patrol the 
Strait of Malacca. In short, in Hamzah's view, clearly there is no legal basis under 
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international law, especially the 1982 LOS Convention, for a third party to conduct 
enforcement action in strategic waterways, except when asked or permitted by the 
States bordering the strait concerned. He also rebutted the argwnent that the lack 
of effective enforcement capacity of the bordering States constitutes a justification 
for foreign intervention in managing security matters in the Strait of Malacca.IOS 
He said, 
The idea of a maritime power putting undue pressure on the bordering countries to 
allow their navy to patrol the Straits ofMaiacca is ludicrous even if the bordering states 
had no adequate capabilities to undertake enforcement on their own. What is more, in 
this case. when both Indonesia and Malaysia have adequate military capabilities to deal 
effectively with the current level of maritime threats in the Straits of Malacca.106 
Hamzah also questioned the real intention ofthe United States and Singapore in 
introducing the idea of sending naval forces to patrol the Strait of Malacca under 
RMSI, as he wrote: "[a]re the US and its ally looking for a new enemy in the region 
using the Straits of Malacca as a pretext? Or, are we witnessing the unfolding of a 
hidden agenda?"107 
Mat Taib Yasin lO8 offered five reasons to explain why both Malaysia and Indo-
nesia rejected the US proposal of sending troops to help patrol the Malacca 
strait. l09 First, the two nations doubted the sincerity of the US offers. This doubt 
centered around the question of why US assistance would come only in the form of 
naval patrols since there are other ways and means to help the littoral States to en-
hance security in the strait. "Given that deployment of mili tary forces is often con-
strued as symbols of intervention and aggression .. . the Littoral States should be 
forgiven for harboring this doubt," he statedYo The US proposal also reminded 
Malaysia and Indonesia of the past history of colonialism. Second, Malaysia and 
Indonesia opposed the US proposal because of the problem of legality. Under ex-
isting international law, in particular the 1982 LOS Convention, "there is no legal 
rationale for foreign powers to patrol the Straits unless or until requested by Litto-
ral States. "111 The third reason was the littoral States' fear of "loss of command and 
control.» As demonstrated in the past, once foreign powers are in the strait, it is dif-
ficult to persuade them to leave. Fourth, the littoral States were concerned that the 
United States may resort to the use of excessive force as demonstrated in its global 
war against terrorism. And finally, Malaysia and Indonesia were concerned about 
the spillover effects of geopolitical rivalry between the major powers in the Strait of 
Malacca, which includes the US strategy to contain China by controlling China's 
access to the strait. III 
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American Maritime Security Expert 
Mark J. Valencia ll3 viewed the dispute over the legitimacy of the US-proposed 
RMSI as a clash between the littoral States, which retain their sovereignty over the 
Strait of Malacca under the legal regimes of innocent passage and transit passage, 
and foreign maritime powers. which want passage of their naval and commercial 
vessels in the strait to be absolutely guaranteed. As the number of pirate attacks and 
the concern over the potential securi ty threat posed by maritime terrorism in 
Southeast Asia. and especially in the Strait ofMalacca area. continued to grow, the 
United States and other nations such as Japan and Australia began to advocate the 
right to intervene in the management of the strait. The intention to intervene was 
further reinforced by the worries that the littoral States-Malaysia and Indonesia-
either did not have the will or capability to fulfill their responsibility to protect the 
strait. As a result. Singapore. the United States and other like-minded nations 
claim that it is the responsibility of the "international community" to intervene. 
However, Malaysia and Indonesia believed that the threat has been exaggerated for 
the purpose of justifying international intervention. To avoid unilateral and pre-
emptive intervention led by the United States. the littoral States-Malaysia. Indo-
nesia and Singapore-should act proactively. The only defense of the littoral States 
against the possibility of unilateral foreign intervention in the management of se-
curity matters in the Strait ofMalacca is to agree to jointly patrol the strait and sup-
press piracy and the threat of terrorism there. ll ~ 
Chinese Maritime Security Expert 
Ji GuoxingllS pointed out that China was concerned that the US-proposed RMSI 
will exceed transit passage rights and encroach upon the sovereignty and sovereign 
rights of the littoral States. in contravention of the 1982 LOS Convention. I 16 Due to 
its rapid economic growth. China relies more on maritime transportation and oil 
imports, which makes it more important to ensure the security of SLOe. Around 60 
percent of China's oil imports come from the Middle East and must go through the 
Strait ofMalacca. The strait has been closely linked with China's economic and energy 
security. Accordingly, China is vel)' much concerned about security in the Strait of 
Malacca and who is in control of the strait. Ii Guoxing pointed out that it is doubt-
ful whether the US-proposed RMSI aims to block China's energy channel and to 
contain China's economic development. China's policy is to support global anti-
terrorism efforts. support the idea of enhancing security in the Strait of Malacca 
and participate in regional cooperation to guarantee SLOC security. It is also 
China's hope that the United States and related nations cou1d establish a terrorism 
prevention mechanism in the strait through consultative cooperation under the 
framework of the 1982 LOS Convention to safeguard the strait's security.ll7 
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Littoral States' Responses to RMSI: July 2004 to June 2006 
In response to the US-proposed anti-terrorism patrols in the Strait ofMalacca un-
der RMSI, and perceiving a foreign intervention in the management of securi ty 
matters in the strait and a foreign military presence in the region to be a threat to 
their sovereignty, Malaysia and Indonesia began to take domestic measures and 
cooperate with Singapore to enhance security in the strait. In addition, they also 
began to seek US and other user States' involvement in their efforts to enhance se-
curity in the Malacca strait, mainly by providing training, logistic support, patrol-
ling vessels, or technological and financial aids. International organizations, such 
as the IMO, and regional cooperative mechanisms such as ARF and APEC, were 
also called upon to provide help. The littoral States' political willingness to take 
more effective actions to improve security in the strait was further motivated by a 
decision of the Joint War Committee OWC) of Lloyd's Market Association in June 
2005, which declared the Strait of Malacca a "high-risk zone" and added it to its list 
of areas which are at risk to war, strikes, terrorism and related perils. Illl The littoral 
States were very much concerned over the JWC decision, mainly because it could 
result in higher insurance premiums for the ships that transit the strait or call at lit-
toral States' ports, which, in turn, would hurt their economy. While repeatedly 
claiming that the JWC decision was not justified, the littoral States also realize that 
unless more effective action was taken to improve safety and securi ty in the Strait 
ofMalacca, the strait would not be removed from the JWC "high-risk zone" list. In 
this section, the national responses of the three littoral States of the Malacca strait 
to the US-proposed RMSI from July 2004 until June 2006 are examined. 
Domestic Actions Taken by Littoral States to Combat Maritime Crimes 
Indonesia 
To improve its capacity to handle the security problems in the Strait of Malacca, 
Indonesia formed Navy Control Command Centers (Puskodal) in Satam and 
Belawan1l9 and set up six regencies at the immediate borders of the Strait of 
Malacca and Strait of Singapore, namely, Rokan Hilir, Bengkalis, Siak, Palawan, 
Indragiri Hir and Karimun, which are believed the most vulnerable and dangerous 
areas for pirate attacks. 120 The main purpose of setting up these regencies was to in-
crease the people's welfare, alleviate poverty, and thus dissuade the local people 
from engaging in piratical activities. Tens of regencies along the straits of Malacca 
and Singapore and around the three chokepoints will be set up in the future . III In 
July 2005, an Indonesian maritime policy unit was established to help fight pirates 
and maintain Malacca security.122 
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In September 2005, Indonesia decided to install radars at nine locations along 
the Strait of Malacca to strengthen securi ty in the area and announced that the In-
tegrated Maritime Security System (IMSS) in the strait will soon be introduced. 123 
Given that most of the cases involving maritime crimes in Indonesia's conven-
tional courts often produce problematic verdicts, which do not have the required 
deterrent effect, the government of Indonesia considered establishing maritime 
courts to try criminals operating in Indonesian waters. 124 Anti-piracy and anti-terror 
exercises were also being held to enhance securi ty in the Strait of Malacca. For in-
stance, in July 2005, the Indonesian Navy launched a three-month operation, 
named Gurita (Octopus) in a bid to fight rampant pirate attacks in the strait l25 and 
in March 2006, an anti-terrorism drill was held in the Strait ofMalacca. 126 
Malaysia 
The government of Malaysia has also adopted a number of domestic measures to 
deal with the maritime threat posed by piracy and armed robberies in the Strait of 
Malacca. In fact, some of these measures had been implemented before RMSI was 
announced in May 2004. For instance, in 2003, Malaysia erected a string of radar 
tracking stations along the Strait of Malacca to monitor traffic and acquired new 
patrol boats to combat piracy.127 In 2004, the Royal Malaysian Navy intensified its 
training activities and patrols in the northern reaches of the Strait of Malacca be-
yond the one-fathom curve in an effort to combat piracy and maritime terror-
ism.12lI In April 2005, it was reported that the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement 
Agency (MMEA) would be formed to be responsible for patrols in the Strait of 
Malacca. l 29 This new agency began patrolling the strai t in December 2005.130 Ma-
laysian maritime police were also asked to increase anti-piracy operations and to 
help ensure the safety and security of the Strai t of Malacca. 131 In February 2006, 
Malaysia announced its plan to step up anti-piracy patrols in the Strait ofMalacca 
by adding up to fifteen new high-speed police boats and conducting joint mari time 
exercises with Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore.132 
Singapore 
When undertaking efforts to fight piracy and maritime terrorism, the government 
of Singapore encounters a dilemma of conflicting interests between protecting its 
shipping industries and stressing that maritime threats in the Strait of Malacca are 
real and therefore asking the li ttoral States to adopt more cooperative law enforce-
ment measures to protect against pirate and maritime terrorist attacks. The basis 
for the JWC to declare the strait a high-risk zone was the security assessment done 
by its consultant, Aegis Defence Services. In August 2005, the JWC stated that the 
Strai t of Malacca would remain on the "high-risk zone" list "until it was dear that 
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the measures planned by governments and other agencies in the area had been im-
plemented and were effective,"133 While taking note of shipping industry concerns 
over rising insurance costs, the government of Singapore has consistently empha-
sized the potential maritime security threat in the Strait ofMalacca and asked co-
operation from the other two littoral States to enhance security in the strait. A 
number of unilateral anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures have also been taken 
by Singapore, such as deploying a fleet of remote-controlled vessels,l}4 providing 
two Fokker planes for joint Malacca strait patrols, 135 deploying anned security teams 
on board selected merchant vessels entering and leaving its territorial waters,l J6 and 
laying high-tech sonar arrays on the seabed across the Malacca strait.l n More im-
portantly, Singapore has been very active in pressing Malaysia and Indonesia to 
agree to a tripartite coordinated patrolling program in the strait and to the involve-
ment of other ARF members and user States in the management of security matters 
in the Malacca strait. 
In addition to the selected domestic anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures as 
mentioned above, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have also cooperated closely 
with the IMO by implementing amendments to Chapter XI-2 (Special Measures to 
Enhance Maritime Security) of the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea, in particular to the International Ships and Port Facility Security (lSPS) 
Code and to the Automatic Identification System (AIS). I38 Indonesia and Malaysia 
also held a special meeting in Jakarta in September 2005 to enhance security in the 
Strait of Malacca. Both joined the US Container Security Initiative, Indonesia in 
March 2003 and Malaysia in March 2004. 
Bilateral Cooperative Programs in the Strait of Malacca 
Between Littoral States 
In 1992, long before the announcement of the RMSI concept by the US Pacific 
Command, Indonesia and Singapore agreed to establish a bilateral program to pa-
trol the Strait of Singapore, which involved the setting up of direct communication 
links between the navies and the relevant agencies of the two littoral States. Coordi-
nated patrols under the program were carried out for three months in the strait. 139 
In May 2005, the navies of both Indonesia and Singapore launched Project 
SURPIC, which is a sea surveillance system. Under the system, the two navies can 
share a common real-time sea situation picture of the Singapore strait.l40 
Similarly, bilateral cooperative efforts had also been made by Indonesia and 
Malaysia to help improve safety and security in the Strait of Malacca. In 1992, a 
Maritime Operation Planning Team was established by the two nations to coordi-
nate their joint patrols in the strait, which are conducted four times a year and 
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involve maritime institutions such as customs, search and rescue, and police. 141 In-
donesia and Malaysia also carry out joint patrols in the Strait ofMalacca under the 
agreed Malindo program. In November 2005, Malaysia and Singapore conducted a 
joint exercise, codename Ex Malapura, in the Malacca strait to promote security in 
the area, which was the seventeenth joint exercise between the two navies. 142 In April 
2006, Malaysia and Indonesia held another joint aerial exercise, code-named Elang 
Malindo XXIJ. 143 
Between Littoral States and User States 
Bilateral cooperative programs or agreements have also been concluded between 
the li ttoral States and user States of the Malacca strait, in particular, the United 
States. In July 2005, as mentioned earlier, a strategic framework agreement for a 
closer cooperation partnership in defense and securi ty was signed betw"een Singa-
pore and the United States, in which the two nations agreed to work toward en-
hanced cooperation in the areas of anti-WMD, anti-terrorism, search and rescue 
and disaster management, intelligence exchange and defense technology.144 While 
both Malaysia and Indonesia raised concerns over the US-Singapore Strategic 
Framework Agreement, in particular their perception that a strong US military 
presence in the region would constitute a potential threat to their sovereignty,145 
they are willing to improve their military relations with the United States. In 2004 
and 2005, Indonesia and the United States held the second and third security dia-
logue respectively, in which the tw"o countries exchanged views on a wide range of 
security and defense issues, including security in the Strait of Malacca. l46 In May 
2005, joint anti-terrorism exercises betw"een the United States and Indonesia were 
held at sea offJakarta. 147 At the end of2005, the United States offered to help Indo-
nesia modernize its armed forces and provide technical assistance to support joint 
security operations in the Strait ofMalacca by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 148 
In January 2006, it was reported that Indonesia and the United States would re-
evaluate their security cooperation following the lifting of the US arms embargo in 
November 2005, especially in dealing with terrorism and securi ty in the Strait of 
Malacca and in Southeast Asia. 149 In the same month, the government of Indonesia 
submitted its request to the United States for technical support in the form of ra-
dar, sensors and improved patrol boat capability to secure the Strait ofMalacca.1so 
Indonesia's cooperation with the United States to fight terrorism and enhance se-
curity in the Malacca strait was also discussed during the visit of US secretary of 
state Condoleezza Rice to Jakarta in mid-March 2006.151 Later that same month, 
Indonesia and the United States conducted a joint exercise on small craft 
counterterrorism maritime interdiction techniques.152 During her visit to Indone-
sia in March 2006, Secretary Rice noted that maritime security is a top priority in 
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Southeast Asia, and that the United States is working with Indonesia and others to 
dose the strait to drug smugglers and hwnan traffickers, pirates and weapons 
proliferators.IS3 $1 million in aid was allocated to Indonesia to help that nation im-
prove security in the Strait of Malacca, according to Admiral Fallon. l$-! In April 
2006, it was reported that the United States would soon provide Indonesia with an 
early warning system to support security maintenance in the Strait of Malacca. It 
will be installed at several points along Indonesia's territory on the waterway and on 
maritime patrol aircraft. In addition, the United States also promised to exchange in-
telligence information with the three littoral States on various matters relating to the 
situation and condition of the Malacca strait. ISS Indonesia also announced that dis-
cussions would be held with the United States at the fourth Indonesia-United States 
Security Dialogue in Washington on April 23-30, 2006 on issues relating to thesecu-
rity of the Strait of Malacca, anti-terrorism, bioterrorism and cyberterrorism, as well 
as the security of Southeast Asia generally.l56 
While differences over the question of securing the Strait of Malacca and the 
concern about an enhanced US military presence in the strait still exist, Malaysia 
also moved to consider accepting help from the United States to strengthen secu-
rity in the strait through improved military relations between the two nations. In 
May 2005, for instance, Malaysia's deputy prime minister and defence minister 
Najib Razak discussed security in the Malacca strait with visiting US deputy secre-
tary of state Robert ZoeI1ick. During the visit, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 
Agreement (ACSA) was signed, which provides a framework for cooperation in 
military logistic matters between the two nations. IS7 During his visit, Deputy Secre-
tary Zoellick stated that the United States respects the role of the littoral States as 
the players with the responsibility for maritime security in the strait but at the same 
time is exploring ways to help Malaysia and Indonesia develop their capacities to 
deal with piracy and other crimes in the strait. ISS In February 2006, Deputy Prime 
Minister Najib Razak. and Admiral Fallon held talks in Kuala Lumpur to discuss pi-
racy and potential terrorist threats in the Strait of Malacca and the waters of 
Sabah. lS9 In early June 2006, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld urged increased ties be-
tween the militaries ofthe United States and Indonesia during his Jakarta visit. He 
also discussed with Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono enhancing 
cooperation between the two nations in the fight against terrorism and the threat 
of piracy in the Strait of Malacca. They also discussed how the United States cou1d 
provide military equipment to Indonesia to enhance Indonesia's military capabil-
ity to eradicate piracy in the Malacca strait.l60 
In addition to the bilateral cooperation between the littoral States and the 
United States, cooperation has also been developed between the littoral States and 
other main user States of the Malacca strait, such as Japan. In March 2005, in 
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response to a pirate attack against a Japanese-owned tugboat in the Strait ofMalacca, 
Japan advised the littoral States of the strait that it was ready to send patrol vessels 
and aircraft to combat piracy. This offer was met with objections by both Malaysia 
and Indonesia. 161 In May 2005, Indonesia's navy chief of staff Admiral Slamet 
Soebijanto said that Indonesia welcomed any assistance from foreign nations in se-
curing the Strait ofMalacca, including from Japan, as long as it was not in the form 
of military force. In response, Japan sent a team to Indonesia tasked with studying 
what type of patrol ships Indonesia needed to deal with maritime crime in the 
strait. 162 In June 2005, during bilateral trade talks, Japan and Indonesia agreed to 
strengthen their cooperation to enhance the safety of navigation in the Strait of 
Malacca.163 In July of that year, Indonesia announced that four patrol boats pro-
vided by Japan would carry out patrolling missions in the Malacca strait. In addi-
tion, Japan donated US$50 million to Jakarta to help safeguard the waterways. 164 It 
was also reported in December 2005 that Japan and the three littoral States jointly 
drew up electronic sea charts of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to help pre-
vent accidents or piracy in the areas. 16S In February 2006 the government of Japan 
pledged again to grant technical aid consisting of detectors and patrol boats to pro-
tect the Malacca strait from possible terrorist attacks. Japan's Nippon Foundation 
also announced its decision to donate a patrol training vessel to Malaysia as part of 
ongoing efforts to reduce piracy and improve maritime security in the Strait of 
Malacca. 11i6 In June 2006, the Japanese government announced that it would do-
nate three patrol boats to Indonesia to help fight terrorism and piracy.167 In April 
2006, Malaysian and Australian naval forces conducted a five-day exercise, code-
named Mastex, in the Malacca strait.l68 In May 2006, Japan and Indonesia held in-
tensive talks on security in the Malacca strait. 169 
Tripartite Cooperative Patrolling Programs of the Littoral States 
It seems safe to point out that the most important development in terms of en-
hancing security in the Strait ofMalacca is the establishment of routine sea and air 
patrols by the maritime security organizations of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singa-
pore. As stated earlier, the main motivations for reaching the tripartite cooperative 
patrolling agreements among the three littoral States were the increasing demand 
from the user States and the international community for more effective law en-
forcement measures to deal with the problem of piracy and possible maritime ter-
rorist attacks, the increasing concern of the littoral States over possible 
intervention of foreign powers by sending their troops to the area and the decision 
ofUoyd's JWC that declared the Strait ofMaiacca a war-risk area. In July 2004 In-
donesia, Malaysia and Singapore launched a coordinated patrol program, known 
as the Malsindo Coordinated Patrol (MCP). Under the program, seven warships 
124 
Yann-hue; Song 
from Indonesia, five from Malaysia and five from Singapore are deployed to main-
tain security in the Strait ofMalacca. However, it shou1d be noted that the warships 
of the participating nations are prohibited from carl)'ing out patrolling activities in 
another participating nation's terri torial waters.170 In securing the Malacca strait 
under the Mep, control points have been set up in Belawan and Batam (Indone-
sia), Lumut (Malaysia) and Changi (Singapore). Another control point, Phuket 
(Thailand), will be set up when Thailand joins the "Eyes in the Sky" program. 171 
In addition to the tripartite coordinated sea patrol program, the three littoral 
States also reached agreement to begin air patrols over the Malacca strait to curb 
piracy and increase security in the strategic waterway under the "Eyes in the Sky" 
program. The initiative for multinational maritime air patrols was proposed by 
Malaysia's deputy prime minister and defence minister Najib Razakat theShangri-
La Dialogue held in June 2005. 172 Under the "Eyes in the Sky" program, each litto-
ral State of the Malacca strait will provide two maritime aircraft per week to patrol 
the strait. The aircraft will only patrol the waterway and will not be allowed to fly 
over the land. While the maritime patrol aircraft would be allowed to fly above an-
other participating nation's waters in the strait, they must fly no less than three 
nautical miles from that country's land. It was also agreed that each patrol aircraft 
will have a Combined Maritime Patrol Team (CMPT) on board, consisting of a 
milital)' officer from each of the participating nations. The CMPT will establish a 
comprehensive surface picture over the patrol area. During the initiative stage for 
the implementation of the maritime air patrol program, only the three littoral 
States and Thailand can participate. But the implementation of the second phase of 
the "Eyes in the Sky" program cou1d involve participation by extra-regional na-
tions, such as the United States, subject to the principle that the sovereignty of the 
littoral States must be respected. 173 Although the "Eyes in the Sky" program was 
launched in September 2005, it was not until April 2006 that the three littoral States 
signed an agreement on the formation of a joint coordinating committee on the 
Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) and Standard Operational Procedures on Coordi-
nated Patrols.17~ Under the agreement, cross-border hot pursuit cannot be carried 
out without prior arrangements between the littoral States. While Singapore and 
Indonesia, as well as Malaysia and Indonesia, have bilateral agreements allowing 
for cross-border hot pursuit, Singapore and Malaysia have no such agreement and 
must seek permission before entering each other's territorial waters. It was pointed 
out that the tripartite patrol agreement is an "open arrangement with opportuni-
ties for the international community to participate," but only with the consent of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 175 In June 2006, at the 5th Shangri-La Dia-
logue, held in Singapore, both India and Japan expressed their willingness to assist 
the littoral States in patrolling the Strait of Malacca. 176 
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Regional Responses and Efforts in Helping Improve Security in 
the Malacca Strait 
Regional Maritime Security Discussion in the Shangri-La Dialogue 
Maritime security in the Strait of Malacca has become one of the important issues 
discussed at the Asian Security Conference, organized by the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies and dubbed the "Shangri-La Dialogue." At the 3rd 
Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore in June 2004, the US-proposed RMSI and 
the concept of sending American troops to help patrol the Strait of Malacca were 
heatedly discussed. Malaysia opposed strongly an enhanced US military presence 
in defending the strait and Southeast Asia from terrorists but agreed to the princi-
ples of shared intelligence and blocking terrorists' financial and logistical networks. 
US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in his speech at the same meeting, de-
scribed the global war on terrorism as a battle against ideological extremism and 
stressed the need to cooperate and share intelligence to fight terrorism effectively. 
At the same time, he sought to ease fears among the Southeast Asian nations, par-
ticularly Malaysia and Indonesia, that RMSI might encroach on their sovereignty. 
The secretary clarified that the initiative was still in its infancy and that "[al ny im-
plications that it would impinge in any way on the territorial waters of some coun-
tries would be inaccurate."m 
The American-proposed RMSI and the possible involvement offoreign powers 
in the management of security in the Strait ofMalacca were continuously discussed 
at the 4th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2005. At the conference, the participating 
defense ministers agreed that regional maritime security, particularly in the Strait 
of Malacca, was a matter of common concern in the region. A consensus was 
reached based on three broad principles: (1) the littoral States must shoulder the 
primary responsibility for the security of regional waterways, (2) the user States 
and the international community have a significant role to play and (3) new coop-
erative measures should be forged in a manner that was respectful of sovereignty 
and consistent with international law. Nations in the region recognized the need to 
enhance practical forms of maritime securi ty cooperation in accordance with these 
principlesys ln June 2006, the participating defense ministers at the 5th Shangri-
La Dialogue discussed ways to advance maritime security cooperation. However, 
the discussions were strictly off the record. 179 It seems clear that both the littoral 
States and user States (particularly the United States) of the Malacca strait are 
adopting an approach of closed door consultations and collaboration to enhance 
maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. 
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Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the tittoral States on the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits 
In August 2005, ministers of foreign affairs of the three littoral States met in Batam, 
Indonesia to discuss matters relating to the safety of navigation, maritime securi ty 
and environmental protection in the straits of Malacca and Singapore. ISO A loint 
Statement was issued after the meeting, in which the three nations reaffirmed their 
sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Malacca and Singapore straits, which are 
defined under the 1982 LOS Convention as straits used for international naviga-
tion. The ministers stressed that the main responsibility for the safety, security and 
environmental protection in the straits lies with the littoral States. The ministers 
emphasized that measures undertaken in the straits in the future should be in ac-
cordance with international law, including the 1982 LOS Convention. It is based 
on this understanding that the three littoral States acknowledged the interest of 
user States and relevant international agencies and the role they could play in respect 
to the straits. Moreover, in recognition of the importance of engaging the States 
bordering the funnels leading to the Malacca and Singapore straits and the major 
users of the straits, the three littoral States supported continuing discussion on the 
overall subject of maritime security in the Southeast Asia region within the frame-
work of ASEAN and ARF. They also acknowledged the good work carried out by 
the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TIEG) on Safety of Navigation in the straits 
of Malacca and Singapore and recognized the efforts of the Revolving Fund OJm-
mittee (RFC) in dealing with issues of environmental protection in the straits. lSI 
The ministers recognized the importance of the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting 
on the straits of Malacca and Singapore in providing the overall framework for co-
operation among them and supported the convening of the chiefs of defence forces 
of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand Informal Meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur on August 1-2, 2005. More importantly, the ministers agreed to address 
the issue of maritime security comprehensively, which includes trans-boundary 
crimes such as piracy, armed robbery and terrorism. They also perceived the need 
to address the issue of trafficking in persons, smuggling of people and weapons, 
and other trans-boundary crimes through appropriate mechanisms. In recogni-
tion of the interest of others in maintaining the safety of navigation, maritime secu-
rity and environmental protection in the straits, the ministers welcomed the 
assistance of the user States, relevant international agencies and the shipping com-
munity in the areas of capacity building, training and technology transfer, and 
other forms of assistance, provided that the main responsibility of the littoral States 
in managing the straits is respected and that the assistance is offered in accordance 
with the 1982 LOS Convention. The ministers expressed their displeasure with the 
decision of the loint War Committee of Lloyd's Market Association that declared 
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the straits of M alacca and Singapore a high-risk zone for piracy and terrorism with-
out consulting with the littoral States and taking into account the existing anti-piracy 
and anti-terrorism measures undertaken by them. Finally, the ministers welcomed a 
special meeting on enhancing safety, security and environmental protection in the 
Malacca and Singapore straits to be held in Jakarta in September 2oo5. IS2 
IMO Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing 
Safety, Security and Environmental Protection 
Due to a genuine concern over possible terrorist attacks in the Strait of Malacca, 
the IMO Council decided in November 2004 to convene a high-level conference to 
consider ways and m eans of enhancing safety, security and environmental protec-
tion in the strai ts.IS3 Accordingly, the IMO Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection 
was held in September 2005. At the conference, Mr. Efthimios Mitropowos, secretary-
general of the IMO, pointed out in his opening remarks that 
[wl ith regard to the question of security versus sovereignty (or vice versa), while I can 
understand and fully respect the sensitivity of any State over the issue, I also believe 
that, whilst States have the right of non-interference in their internal affairs, they also 
have concurrent responsibilities towards their own people, the international 
community and their international engagements. Whatever the answer to this, there 
can be no excuse fo r inactivity, whether the danger is clear and present or perceived as a 
future possibility.l84 
Accordingly, the secretary-general called on the three littoral States bordering 
the straits ofMalacca and Singapore, user States ofthe straits, industry and all other 
stakeholders to work together to produce an outcome conducive to building confi-
dence in any efforts undertaken jointly to enhance safety, security and environ-
mental protection in the straits. The secretary-general also made it clear that any 
action undertaken in the future showd be based on the consent, support and coop-
eration ofthe littoral States concerned, which should be invited to playa principal 
role in all developments. In addition, any action undertaken must be consistent 
with international law, including the relevant provisions of the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion. ISS The meeting produced the Jakarta Statement, 
which emphasizes the need to balance the interest of the littoral States and the user 
States while respecting the littoral States' sovereignty, and to establish a mechanism to 
facilitate cooperation between them to discuss issues relating to the safety, security and 
environmental protection of the Straits ofMaiacca and Singapore, including exploring 
possible options for burden sharing. IM 
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For the purpose of enhancing the safety. security and environmental protection 
of the Malacca and Singapore straits. the thirty-four nations participating in the 
meeting agreed 
• that the work of the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TIEG) on Safety of 
Navigation in enhancing the safety of navigation and in protecting the marine 
environment in the Straits. including the efforts of the TIEG in relation to the 
implementation of Article 43 of the 1982 LOS Convention in the Straits, should 
continue to be supported and encouraged; 
• that a mechanism be established by the three littoral States to meet, on a 
regular basis, with user States, the shipping industry and others with an interest in 
safe navigation through the Straits, to discuss issues relating to the safety. security 
and environmental protection of the Straits, as well as to facilitate cooperation in 
keeping the Straits safe and open to navigation. including exploring the possible 
options for burden sharing. and to keep the IMO informed, as appropriate. of the 
outcome of such meetings; 
• that efforts should be made through the three littoral States to establish and 
enhance mechanisms for information exchange within and between States. 
building, where possible. on existing arrangements. such as TIEG mechanisms, 
so as to enhance maritime domain awareness in the Straits and thus contribute to 
the enhancement of co-operative measures in the areas of safety, security and 
environmental protectio n; and 
• to promote. build upon and expand co-operative and operational 
arrangements of the three littoral States, including the Tripartite Technical Expert 
Group on Maritime Security, coordinated maritime patrols in the Straits through, 
inter alia, maritime security training programs and other fo rms of cooperation. 
such as maritime exercises, with a view to further strengthening capacity building 
in the littoral States to address security threats to shipping. 187 
The IMO has also been invited to consider. in consultation with the littoral 
States, convening a series of follow-on meetings for the littoral States to identify 
and prioritize their needs, and for user States to identify possible assistance to re-
spond to those needs. which may include information exchange. capacity build-
ing. training and technical support. with a view to promote and coordinate 
cooperative measures. ISS A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by and 
among the governments of the three littoral States and IMO for the implementa-
tion of a regional Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) demonstration project in 
the straits of Malacca and Singapore (MEH MOU) and a Memorandwn on Ar-
rangements by and among the three littoral States, IMO, International Hydro-
graphic Organization (IHO). International Association of Independent Tanker 
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Owners (INTERTANKO) and International Chamber of Shipping (lCS) to imple-
ment specific activities of Article 4 of the MEH MOU were signed.189 Also at the 
meeting, China, South Korea and Norway were encouraged to join Japan in mak-
ing financial contributions to the Malacca Straits Council. Over the past thirty-
five years or so, the Nippon Foundation of Japan had contributed more than 
US$100 million to the counciJ.l90 
Tokyo Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security 
In January 2006, the Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security 
was held in Tokyo, attended by the transport ministers of the G-8 members and 
six Asian nations, namely, Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
South Korea. The purpose of this conference was to discuss international trans-
port security issues. A ministerial declaration and three ministerial statements on 
security in the international maritime transport sector, aviation security and land 
transport security were adopted by the conference. The Ministerial Statement on 
Security in the International Maritime Transport Sector stressed the importance 
of ensuring continued compliance with the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) and 
the ISPS Code, which were adopted in December 2002 and entered into force in 
July 2004. 191 
The participants in the conference welcomed the adoption of the 2005 Proto-
col to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), and the 2005 Protocol to the 
1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. Among the unlawful acts covered by 
the 1988 SUA Convention in Article 3 are the seizure of ships by force, acts of vio-
lence against persons on board ships and the placing of devices on board a ship 
which are likely to destroy or damage it. 192 In addition, the IMO was invited by the 
transport ministers 
[tJo consider, in cooperation with WCO [World Customs Organization], the 
development and adoption, as necessary, of appropriate measures to enhance the 
security of the maritime transport of containers in the international supply chain, 
while respecting efficiency and international harmonization; 
to undertake a study and make, as necessary, recommendations to enhance the security 
of ships other than those already covered by SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, in 
an effort to protect them from becoming targets of acts of terrorism, piracy, or armed 




In May 2006, the IMO announced that parties to the SOLAS Convention had 
given initial acceptance to new security measures, which require ships to be tracked 
by satellite to fight terrorism and to prevent the introduction of WMD into the 
supply chain. Under the new Long- Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) reg-
ulation, which is expected to become effective in January 2008, merchant ships will 
be required to transmit information about their identity, location and date and 
time of their position through satellite-based technology.l94 The new regulation on 
LRIT is included in the 1974 SOLAS Convention's Chapter V on SafetyofNaviga-
tion, through which LRIT is introduced as a mandatol)' requirement for passenger 
ships, including high-speed craft and cargo ships of three-hundred gross tonnage 
and upwards, as well as mobile offshore drilling units on international voyages. 19$ 
The Plan to Establish the ReCAAP lnformation Sharing Center 
To help enhance safety and security in the Strait ofMalacca, Japan launched an ini-
tiative in 2001, aiming to set up an anti-piracy cooperative framework among 
ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. As 
a result, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was concluded in Tokyo in November 
2004. 196 The agreement was opened for signature by Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambo-
dia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam, and enters into force ninety days 
after the date on which the tenth instrument of notification by a State mentioned 
above, indicating the completion of its domestic requirements, is submitted to the 
government of Singapore, the depository of the agreement. 197 As of June 2006, 
twelve nations l98 had signed, and with the exception of Brunei, had ratified the 
ReCAAP agreement, which entered into force on September 4, 2006.199 
A key pillar of the ReCAAP is the Information Sharing Center (ISC), which will 
be established in accordance with Part II of the agreement. The ISC, located in Sin-
gapore, is an international organization with major functions of facilitating com-
munication and information exchanges between the member nations and 
improving the quality of statistics and reports on piracy and armed robbery against 
ships in the region. It was reported that one of the major reasons fo r the failure of 
Malaysia and Indonesia to sign the agreement to date was their displeasure with the 
decision to set up the 1SC in Singapore. However, it should be noted that it was 
mentioned in the Batam Agreement that Malaysia and Indonesia "take note of" the 
ISC, and agreed to cooperate with the center.200 
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The Role of Existing Regional Mechanisms Promoting Maritime 
Security Cooperation 
ASEAN and ARF 
Cooperative measures to deal with the problem of piracy and maritime securi ty 
threats among member States of the ASEAN201 and participating nations in the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)202 had been sought long before the announcement 
of RMSI by the US Pacific Command in May of 2004. As early as November 2001 
ASEAN adopted a declaration on joint action to counter terrorism.203 ln May 2002 
a special ASEAN ministerial meeting on terrorism was held in Kuala Lumpur in 
which a joint communique on terrorism and the Work Program to Implement the 
ASEAN Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crimes were adopted.21)4 In August 
2002, the United States and ASEAN, and in January 2003 the European Union and 
ASEAN, issued joint declarations of cooperation to combat international terror-
ism.zos All member States of ASEAN, including the three littoral States of the 
Strait ofMalacca, were called upon to solidify governmental efforts in areas of in-
formation exchange, training, legislation, law enforcement, institution building 
and extra-regional cooperation. In December 2003, the ASEAN-Japan Seminar 
on Maritime Security and Combating Piracy was held in Tokyo. This was fol-
lowed by another ASEAN-US Workshop on Enhancing Maritime Anti-piracy 
and Counter-terrorism Cooperation in the ASEAN Region held in Manila in 
April 2004. 206 
On May 9, 2006, the first ASEAN defense ministers meeting was held in Kuala 
Lumpur, at which the issues of human security and transnational crimes such as 
terrorism, piracy, trafficking, smuggling and cooperation for disaster relief were 
discussed. To deal with these issues, considered as ASEAN's immediate security 
challenges, the ministers agreed 
• to promote regional peace and stab ility through dialogue and cooperation 
in defense and security; 
• to give guidance to existing senior defense and milital)' officials' dialogue 
and cooperation in the field of defense and security within ASEAN and with 
dialogue partners; 
• to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of 
defense policies and threat perceptions, security challenges as well as 
enhancement of transparency and openness; and 
• to contribute to the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community as 
stipulated in the Bali Concord II and to promote the implementation of the 
Vientiane Action Programme.207 
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As far as efforts undertaken by the participating nations of ARF are concerned, 
in June 2003 the Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to 
Maritime Safety was adopted at the tenth ARF meeting.208 In the statement, the 
participating States and organizations recognized that "[p]iracy and armed rob-
bery against ships and the potential fo r terrorist attacks on vulnerable sea shipping 
threaten the growth of the Asia-Pacific region, and disrupt the stability of global 
commerce, particularly as these have become tools of transnational organized 
crime."209 They also recognized that "[m]aritime security is an indispensable and 
fundamen tal condition for the welfare and economic security of the ARF region" 
and that "[e]nsuring this security is in the direct interest of all countries, and in 
particular the ARF countries."2IO They promised to achieve effective implementa-
tion of relevant international maritime instruments that aim to enhance the safety 
and security of shipping and port operations. The relevant instruments include the 
1982 LOS Convention, the 1988 SUA and its Protocol for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 
the 1974 SOLAS Convention and the relevant amendments to that convention, 
and the ISPS Code. ARF member nations are encouraged to become parties to the 
relevant international maritime conventions, if they had not yet done SO.211 At the 
11 th ARF meeting, held in July 2004, the participating ministers affirmed that "ter-
rorism, irrespective of its origins, motivations or objectives, constitutes a threat to 
all peoples and countries, and to the common interest in ensuring peace, stability, 
security and economic prosperity in the region and beyond."212 They also adopted 
the ARF Statement on Strengthening Transport Security against International Ter-
rorism, which expressed the determination of the ARF participants to take con-
crete and cooperative measures in safeguarding their means of transportation from 
terrorist threats.213 
In September 2004 the ARF Workshop on Maritime Security was held in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. During the discussion, the participants identified piracy, trans-
national organized crimes (such as smuggling) and terrorist activities as major 
threats to maritime security.214 Theyconcurred that there was no single nation that 
could handle maritime security alone and therefore cooperation, based on inter-
national law, is a must to manage maritime security effectively. In the context of 
the Malacca strait, the participants welcomed the coordinated sea patrols among 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and other bilateral cooperation with India, noting 
that this was in line with the primary responsibility of the three littoral States of the 
straits of Malacca and Singapore. They also noted that the proposed Maritime 
Electronic Highway to be applied in the straits could enhance the transparency of 
navigation and overall traffic control and also provide the basis for intensive moni-
toring of the real-time navigational situation.2lS During the discussion on the way 
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to enhance cooperation on maritime security, the participants recognized that col-
lective effort is vital to address maritime security threats. However, the collective 
effort should be undertaken on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity and in accordance with the UN Charter and other recognized interna-
tionallaw. The use of bilateral and regional agreements was believed to be a useful 
method to enhance maritime security. It was also pointed out that there is need for 
comprehensive action, including enhancing cooperation on fighting piracy and 
armed robbery in the region between ARF participants' shipping and international 
organizations. The meeting was divided into three breakout sessions to further 
discuss the issue of maritime security. Breakout Session I (Managing Maritime 
Challenges and Threats) highlighted the need to establish intergovernmental 
agreements, such as standard operating procedures, and to develop a regional con-
tingency plan where and when possible and appropriate.216 Breakout Session III 
(Enhancing Cooperation on Maritime Security) identified four areas for enhanc-
ing cooperation on maritime security, namely, cooperative frameworks; common 
understanding of threats; information exchange mechanisms, policies and proce-
dures; and national capacities.217 
In March 2005 Singapore and the United States co-hosted a meeting on an ARF 
Confidence Building Measure (CBM) on Regional Cooperation in Maritime Secu-
rity in Singapore. In his speech at the meeting, Singapore's Defence Minister Teo 
Chee Hean urged that "l ilt would be useful for the ARF to move beyond dialogue 
on maritime security and work towards conducting an ARF maritime security ex-
ercise in the near future. "218 During the discussion at the meeting, some partici-
pants suggested that maritime security cooperation in the region should be 
formulated in accordance with the following three broad principles: (1) the pri-
mary responsibility for the safety and security of key waterways like the Malacca 
and Singapore straits should lay with the littoral States; (2) due to the multiplicity 
of stakeholders, and the complexity of the task at hand, there should be a role for all 
stakeholders, including interested nations, international organizations like the 
IMO, the shipping community and even multinational organizations; and (3) the 
cooperative effort should proceed on the basis of consultation and in accordance 
with internationallaw.219 Meeting participants agreed that ARF should play an im-
portant role in forging regional cooperation in maritime security, given that its wide 
membership encompasses the key stakeholders in regional maritime security.22(1ln 
July 2005, at the 12th ARF meeting, the participating ministers welcomed ARF's sus-
tained efforts in promoting maritime safety and security and noted the following 
four areas for future cooperation: multilateral cooperation, operational solutions to 
maritime safety and security, shipping and port security, and application of tech-
nology for maritime safety and security.221 They also adopted the ARF Statement 
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on Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and 
Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Other Transna-
tional Crimes.222 The establishment of a Regional Marine Training Centre had also 
been discussed at the ARF workshops and the ARF Senior Officers Meeting.223 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
The Council fo r Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was established 
at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1993.224 The CSCAP Charter was adopted in 
December 1993 and was subsequently amended in August 1995.225 The purpose of 
setting up the CSCAP was to provide a structured process for regional confidence 
building and security cooperation among nations and territories in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Working groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. Four 
working groups were established in 1993-94. These were concerned with (1) mari-
time cooperation, (2) the enhancement of security cooperation in the North PacificJ 
Northeast Asia, (3) confidence- and security-building measures, and (4) coopera-
tive and comprehensive security. In December 2004, a restructuring of the CSCAP 
working groups was undertaken to better reflect changes taking place in the strate-
gic environment in the region. Consequently, the four CSCAP working groups are 
no longer active. Instead, six study groups were established: (1) Capacity-building 
for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, (2) Countering the Prolifer-
ation of WMD in the Asia Pacific, (3) Future Prospects for Multilateral Securi ty 
Frameworks in Northeast Asia, (4) Human Trafficking, (5) Regional Peacekeeping 
and Peacebuilding, and (6) Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against 
International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific Region. These 
study groups were to complete their functions in December 2006. CSCAP held 
general meetings before 2003 on a regular basis in accordance with its charter. In 
December 2002, it was decided to change the term '"'General Meeting" to "General 
Conference." The firs t CSCAP General Conference was held in December 2003, 
but was referred to as the 4th CSCAP General Conference. The 5th CSCAP General 
Conference was held in December 2005. 
A number of non-binding documents had previously been adopted at different 
CSCAP working group meetings to address the issues concerning maritime safety 
and shipping security before the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United 
States.226 CSCAP Memorandum No. 1, for example, encourages CSCAP members 
to undertake" [c ]ooperative efforts to ensure the security of sea-lanes and sea lines 
of communication, with the enhancement of capabilities and maritime surveil-
lance, safety, and search rescue operations."227 Paragraph 3 ofCSCAP Memoran-
dum No.4 encourages member nations to become parties to the 1982 LOS Con-
vention and other relevant international instruments, recognizing that this will 
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contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, cooperation, sustainable devel-
opment and friendly relations in the Asia- Pacific region. Paragraph 15 of the same 
Memorandum encourages CSCAP member nations to consult with regard to the 
ratification, implementation and participation in relevant international conven-
tions and instruments concerning maritime safety. CSCAP Memorandum No.5 
urges member nations to adopt measures that would promote law and order at sea 
and reduce the incidence of maritime crime, which includes piracy and maritime 
terrorism. 
Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, CSCAP Memorandums No.6 and 
No.7 were adopted in December 2002 and July 2003 respectively,228 and a "Report 
on International Terrorism" was issued in March 2002 after the CSCAP Study 
Group Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in February 2002. CSCAP Mem-
orandum No.7 recognizes the importance ofthe concept of human security and 
encourages CSCAP member nations to, inter alia, endorse and implement rele-
vant UN conventions and protocols, and supporting regional agreements, against 
terrorism and transnational crimes. The Report on International Terrorism 
identifies the elements of a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism in the 
Asia-Pacific region. It urges CSCAP working groups to coordinate their research 
agendas in order to advance collective efforts in combating international terror-
ism. CSCAP member nations are encouraged to ratify the various UN conven-
tions in relation to transnational crimes and related issues, adopt the UN resolu-
tion on terrorism and implement international and regional resolutions on 
transnational crimes and terrorism. In addition, it is stated in the report that the 
CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation will continue to examine the 
following issues: (1) the vulnerability of naval and commercial shipping, off-
shore platforms, ports and harbors and coastal settlements to terrorist attack; 
(2) the threat of maritime terrorism generally, including the use of ships as ve-
hicles for conducting terrorist attacks; and (3) the potential for reducing vulner-
abilities and countering the threat from maritime terrorist attacks.229 
At the 5th CSCAP General Conference, emerging security challenges in the 
Asia-Pacific region were widely discussed, which included terrorism, human traf-
ficking, the development ofWMD, maritime security threats, natural disasters and 
the recent threat of infectious diseases in the region. Maritime security is one of the 
seven topics chosen to be discussed at the conference. In addition, one of the spe-
cial speeches delivered at the meeting was on the Indonesian perspective of securi ty 
in the Strait of Malacca. During the discussion, there were common concerns 
among Indonesia and other States which are also stakeholders in the security of the 
Strait of Malacca, which included the safety of navigation, the protection of the 
marine environment, the need to cooperate on search and rescue, contingency 
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plans against pollution, elimination of piracy and anned robberies, and preventing 
maritime terrorism. Based on experience over the last three decades, it was the In-
donesian view that 
• the problems of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be solved 
through practical/technical mechanisms and cooperation; 
• cost and burden sharing in promoting safety and securi ty of navigation are 
possible with the cooperation of Japan, and are increasingly necessary and 
essential; 
• user States should voluntarily cooperate with the coastal nations to promote 
the safety of navigation and to protect the marine environment in the straits, as 
well as in law enforcement activities; 
• what is needed now is a more authoritative and pennanent institution to 
follow up on previous measures; and 
• while cooperation and assistance from user States are needed and required 
under the 1982 LOS Convention, there are certain situations with which 
Indonesia would not be comfortable, such as the stationing or hiring of foreign 
navies or marines, arming commercial vessels with offensive weapons, and joint 
patrols of foreign navies in the straits.230 
During discussion after the speech, the debate about the relationship between 
piracy and terrorism was raised. There was also a discussion on sovereignty, espe-
cially linking issues such as the resistance towards foreign navies, and also relations 
with user States.231 
APEC 
In October 2001, APEC leaders meeting in Shanghai signed a statement on 
counterterrorism in which they pledged to cooperate fully, through close commu-
nication and cooperation among economic policy and financial authorities, to en-
sure that international terrorism does not disrupt economies and markets.212 In 
October 2002, APEC leaders in Los Cabos, Mexico issued a Statement on Recent 
Acts of Terrorism in APEC Members &onomies, in which they condemned ter-
rorist acts in the APEC region, including those that occurred in Bali, in the Philip-
pines and in Moscow earlier that month. They also encouraged joint efforts of 
APEC economies in mitigating the adverse impact of terrorist attacks in the af-
fected economies and called for strengthened international cooperation to support 
efforts to eliminate terrorism and restore confidence in the region. m 
In the Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth, adopted on 
October 26, 2002, APEC leaders declared their intention to work together to secure 
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the How of goods and people through measures to, inter alia, promote ship and 
port security plans, install automatic identification systems on certain ships, and 
enhance cooperation on fighting piracy in the region between APEC fora and orga-
nizations such as the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center and 
the IMO. The Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) program aims to increase 
container and port securi ty and to develop mechanisms to track shipments more 
effectively throughout the supply chain. In addition, APEC countries are asked to 
ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, and to implement quicldy and decisively all measures needed to prevent ter-
rorists and their supporters from accessing the international financial system, as 
called for in UN Securi ty Council Resolutions 1373 and 1390.234 At the APEC 
STAR III Conference,235 held in Incheon, Korea, February 25--26, 2005, Maritime 
Security Panel 3 discussions explored possible means of cooperation among APEC 
economies and relevant international organizations in protecting key APEC sea 
lanes such as the straits ofMalacca and Singapore from terrorist attacks and acts of 
piracy, and provided suggestions in relation to trade implications from an APEC-
specific perspective. It was concluded that 
• APEC should provide proactive law enforcement support in the search for a 
long-term solution to deal with maritime security, 
various levels of cooperation are required, 
APEC economies should endeavor to share information and intelligence, 
and 
an "Assistance Fund" that brings all stakeholders together would be 
helpful.236 
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Five Power Defence 
Arrangement 
The basic structure of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)231 and the 
Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA),238 with their traditional focus on mili-
tary security, precluded dealing with non-conventional security threats, such as piracy 
and maritime terrorism. However, in response to the changing regional maritime 
security environment, both WPNS and FPDA felt the need to reconsider the focus 
of some of their activities. In June 2004, Malaysia's deputy prime minister Najib 
Razak stated that for the FPDA to stay relevant, it has to be "reconfigured" to deal 
with new threats in the form of terrorism. Australian defence minister Robert Hill 
also agreed that the FPDA should extend the scope of its activities to include 
counterterrorism training. ll9 At the 3rd Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore in 
June 2004, the need to expand beyond traditional territorial threats to deal with 
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non-conventional security threats such as maritime terrorism was recognized. It 
was believed that maritime security exercises could soon be commonplace among 
the FPDA armed forces. 2<tO As a result, in September 2005 the five powers held a 
joint naval exercise in the waters off Malaysia and Singapore that was designed to 
tackle terrorism rather than wage conventional war. The exercise rellected the 
growing concerns in Southeast Asia and, in particular, the Strai t of Malacca over 
the problem of piracy and terrorist attacks.2.tl In March 2006 it was proposed that 
Australia, Britain and New Zealand, the three non -littoral member States of the 
FPDA, be invited to join the "Eyes in the Sky" program as long as the sovereignty of 
the littoral States of the Malacca strait is respected.242 
The WPNS is also slowly adapting to the new maritime security environment in 
the Asia-Pacific region, in particular dealing with the threat of piracy, sea robbery 
and maritime terrorist attack. To adjust its focus of activities, the WPNS may need 
to consider how the maritime security environment is changing and how to engage 
with coast guards so that regional mari time security issues can be effectively ad-
dressed.243 More importantly, the WPNS might be selected by the US Pacific Com-
mand as an alternative regional forum to discuss maritime security issues.244 
Possible adjustments were to be addressed by the WPNS in WPNS Workshop 2006 
and in the 10th WPNS to be held in Hawaii June 25-29 and O<tober 29 to Novem-
ber 2,2006, respectively. 
Positive Results from Littoral States' Responses to the US-Proposed RMSJ 
Within such a short period of time, about three years since May 2004 until today, secu-
rity in the Strait of Malacca has been improved significantly mainly because of the 
cooperative efforts undertaken by the littoral States in response to the US-pro-
posed RMSI and the likelihood of American unilateral deployment of its forces to 
help patrol the strait, and also in response to the decision by the British-based Joint 
War Committee of Lloyd's Market Association to put the strait on its list of war-risk 
areas in June 2005. According to the figures released by the 1MB in its 2005 Annual 
Report on Piracy Against Ships, the number of pirate attacks in the Malacca strait 
dropped from thirty-eight in 2004 to only twelve attacks in 2005.24S There were no 
reported pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca from January 1 to March 31, 2006, 
compared with eight in 2004 and four in 2005.2-16 "Action by law enforcement agen-
cies, notably in Indonesia and the Malacca strait, has continued to be effective" and 
"Indonesia in particular, has increased its efforts to defeat piracy by way of a show of 
force in known (pirate) hotspots," said the 1MB in Apri12006.l41 
In addition to the Maisitldo joint sea patrols and the "Eyes in the Sky" joint air pa-
trols, launched by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in July 2004 and in September 
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2005, respectively, a nwnber of domestic anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures 
and bilateral cooperative programs have also been developed to safeguard the 
Strait ofMalacca. New national organizations or units such as Malaysia's Maritime 
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and Singapore's Accompanying Sea Security Team 
(ASSeT) were established to be responsible for maritime security matters. The 
ReCAAP Information Network System was launched in April 2006 and the 
ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre was to be established after the entrance into 
force of the ReCAAP Agreement. Moreover, bilateral cooperation between the lit-
toral States and user States, in particular, the United States, Japan and India, has 
been strengthened to help improve maritime security in the Strait of Malacca and 
in Southeast Asia. The littoral States, especially Indonesia, have received the offer 
by user States of technical aids, patrol training and equipment. It is expected that 
the littoral States will receive more financial and technical assistance from the user 
States, including China and South Korea in the future. At the same time, it has been 
reiterated that the sovereignty of the littoral States will be respected. Regional and 
international concerns over safety and security in the Strait of Malacca will con-
tinue to selVe as an important external policy factor in the process of enhancing se-
curity in the strait and in the region. Continued discussions on the issue of 
enhancing maritime security in the Strait of Malacca under the IMO framework 
and in the existing regional security organizations, such as ASEAN, ARF, CSCAP, 
APEC, FPDA, WPNS and the Shangri-La Dialogue, are anticipated. 
Challenges Ahead for the Management of Security in the Malacca Strait 
Notwithstanding the many positive developments in relation to the management 
of security in the Strait ofMaiacca since June 2004, there are challenges lying ahead 
for both littoral and user States. One of the challenges is to petition the loint War 
Committee to remove the Strait ofMalacca from its list of war-risk areas. The ship-
ping industries of the three littoral States of the strait have been asking the Com-
mittee to change its risk assessment, but without avail. Unless the littoral States are 
able to prove the effectiveness of their coordinated patrolling programs, it is likely 
that the strait will remain on the list. 
The effectiveness of the tripartite coordinated air and sea patrolling programs 
agreed to by the three littoral States has also been questioned. A Singaporean mari-
time security analyst listed three limitations to the effectiveness of the cooperative 
programs: (1) the nations view independence and sovereignty very strongly and 
therefore generally are reluctant to agree to participate more actively in coopera-
tive activities; (2) there is a gap between the nations with regard to lawenforcement 
capacities; and (3) there exists political suspicion among them, in addition to the 
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lack of political frameworks that could fac ili tate more cooperative maritime secu-
rity efforts. Ironing out their differences over the seriousness of the maritime secu-
ri ty threats and the possible association between piracy and maritime terrorism in 
the Strait ofMalacca and in Southeast Asia will be a challenge to the littoral States. 
It has been pointed out that the law enforcement capacities of Malaysia and Sin-
gapore are good, but Indonesia's difficult resource problems need to be resolved if 
piracy and possible maritime terrorist attacks are to be dealt with effectively. It re-
mains to be seen to what extent and how soon these problems can be resolved, either 
by significant investment provided by the li ttoral States themselves or by financial 
and technical aid from user States, such as the United States, Japan and India now, 
as well as Australia, China and South Korea in the future. The development of a 
closer strategic and military cooperation between the littoral States and foreign 
powers, in particular, the United States, could help justify the decision to offer 
more assistance to help the littoral States enhance their maritime security capabili-
ties. The United States and Indonesia have resumed military ties, but progress to-
wards greater accountability and complete military reform in Indonesia remains to 
be seen. The governments of Indonesia and Malaysia could reconsider their posi-
tion on the PSI, such as by partially or selectively participating in the PSI activities. 
A positive development in this regard is the announcement made by the US gov-
ernment that it "stand [sl ready to help Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand to secure the Straits of Malacca. "248 In addition, the signing of the Strate-
gic Framework Agreement between the United States and Singapore in July 2005 
could be welcomed by the other two littoral States as a positive development help-
ful to the enhancement of maritime security in the Strait of Malacca in particular 
and in Southeast Asia in general. 
Another challenge to the effective management of security in the Strait of 
Malacca is how to find an acceptable approach that can compromise between the 
littoral States' sovereign concerns and the user States' demand for a more direct in-
volvement in security matters in the strait. This requires that both sides reach 
agreement on establishing a burden-sharing mechanism or a multilaterallinterna-
tional cooperative security mechanism in the Strait ofMalacca area. To help estab-
lish a burden-sharing mechanism, there is a need to amend Article 43 of the 1982 
LOS Convention for the purpose of expanding the scope of burden sharing to in-
clude those costs associated with the management of security in the Strait of 
Malacca. The early establishment of a regional marine training center or a piracyl 
terrorism information sharing center would be seen as another important test of 
the political will of the littoral States and the concerned nations in the region to en-
hance security in the Strait of Malacca and in Southeast Asia. 
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Finally, it would be important for the littoral States to become contracting par-
ties to the IMO's 1988 SUA Convention, the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Con-
vention, and the 2004 ReCAAP agreement. At present, among the littoral States of 
the Malacca strait, only Singapore has ratified the 1988 SUA Convention and the 
ReCAAP agreement. It remains a challenge to have both Indonesia and Malaysia 
ratify the aforementioned maritime security-related international treaties. 
Conclusion 
Under the pressure spreading outwards from the United States, in particular 
through the proposal of RMSI and the consideration of deploying forces to deal 
with potential maritime security threats in the Strait of Malacca and Southeast 
Asia, the three littoral States-Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore-were forced to 
adopt additional domestic anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures and to develop 
tripartite coordinated sea and air patrol programs to improve security in the strai t. 
New governmental agencies or units, such as the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement 
Agency, the Singaporean Accompanying Sea Security Team, and the Indonesian 
Maritime Policy Unit, have been formed to be responsible for managing security in 
the strait. More patrol boats have been acquired and new monitoring systems have 
been set up to help strengthen the littoral States' control over traffic in the strait. Bi-
lateral cooperative programs have also been developed between the littoral States 
themselves and between the littoral States and user States, such as the United 
States, Japan and India, and perhaps in the future with China, South Korea and 
other nations, to keep the region's important waterways safe. 
A number of important political statements, such as the Batam Agreement, the 
Jakarta Agreement of 2005 and the first ASEAN Defence Ministers' Statement of 
May 2006 have been adopted or issued, in which both littoral and user States are 
urged to take more cooperative actions to help enhance security in the Malacca 
strait. It seems that a more effective, collaborative approach to deal with the mari-
time security matters in the Malacca strait and in Southeast Asia has been devel-
oped since the first half of2004. It is believed that this development will benefit the 
international maritime community and, in particular, the shipping industries that 
rely heavily on safe navigation of the Strait ofMalacca. However, piracy and mari-
time terrorism and other transnational crimes in the strait and in Southeast Asia 
are likely to remain a major maritime security concern for governments and ship-
ping industries for some years to come. 
To deal effectively with maritime security threats in the Strait of Malacca, a 
number of challenges need to be overcome. These include the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the agreed tripartite coordinated sea and air patrols programs, 
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and the littoral States' ratification of the maritime security-related international 
conventions, in particular, the 2004 ReCAAP agreement, the 1988 SUA Conven-
tion and the 2005 protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention. There is also a need to es-
tablish a burden-sharing agreement that is acceptable to both the littoral and user 
States. But the challenge to be overcome as soon as possible is to have Lloyd's loint 
War Committee remove the Strait of Malacca from its list of war-risk areas. 
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